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Although the Supreme Court held in a 1983 decision, Marsh v. Chambers, that the
traditional practice of prayers by legislative chaplains did not constitute an Establishment
Clause violation, the decision left open whether such prayers could be “sectarian.” That
open question has been litigated in several recent cases, and a similar controversy has
arisen over public prayers by military chaplains. The specific focus of most of these
controversies has been whether legislative chaplains could include references to “Jesus”
or “Allah” in their prayers. This article places the controversies in a broader context of
thinking about the Establishment Clause by distinguishing four rival conceptions of that
Clause. Two of these positions, here called “Enlightenment separationism” and
“Evangelical separationism”, would prohibit legislative prayer altogether – a view ruled
out by Marsh. The two other positions, called the “Religion of the Republic” and the
“Pluralist Polity” approaches, follow Marsh in permitting the practice, but differ from each
other over the nature of permissible prayers. The former position would permit legislative
prayer only in the forms of “ceremonial deism” or of “American civil religion”; the latter
permits legislative prayers of any kind, however “sectarian” or “denominational,”
provided that over time the prayers reflect a sufficient variety of religious voices and
perspectives to dispel any appearance that the legislature is favoring any particular form
of religious belief. The article argues that the “Pluralist Polity” position accords better with
the tradition of religious liberty in this country by allowing the extraordinary vitality and
diversity of the American religious scene to find fuller and freer expression. In support of
these conclusions, the article develops in detail three main arguments: that the purported
distinction between “sectarian” and “non-sectarian” prayer is illusory; that the attempt to
enforce such a distinction will operate in a discriminatory fashion; and that the approach
that favors a “Religion of the Republic” will itself threaten to fall foul of the Establishment
Clause.
The article then assesses, against the standards of the Pluralist Polity approach,
three different models for selecting legislative chaplains – the first involving (as in Marsh)
the appointment of a single official chaplain from a particular faith; the second involving
the rotation of daily chaplains who are freely selected by individual legislators in their
own discretion; and the third involving modest constraints intended to ensure that within
reasonable limits all faiths in the political community are eventually invited to provide
chaplains. It finds that the last model provides a solution that combines American
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2religious pluralism with the country’s tradition of religious liberty to provide a solution
that is sound both constitutionally and as public policy.
Prayer by a legislative chaplain before the start of official
business does not violate the Establishment Clause. So the
Supreme Court held in a 1983 decision, Marsh v. Chambers.2
But while Marsh is settled law,3 the scope of the decision has
2 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court upheld, as against an Establishment Clause
challenge, the practice of the Nebraska State Legislature of opening each legislative day
with a prayer by a chaplain. In that instance, the chaplain, who was chosen every two
years by a board of the State Legislature and paid a monthly stipend, was a
Presbyterian minister who had served as chaplain for some sixteen years. The
challenge to this practice was based on three points: first, that only a chaplain from a
single denomination had been selected for sixteen years; second, that the chaplain was
paid at public expense; and third, that “the prayers are in the Judaeo-Christian
tradition.” Id. at 793. Weighing these three factors “against the historical background”
of prayer before legislative bodies, the Court concluded that they “do not serve to
invalidate Nebraska’s practice.” Id. While acknowledging that “[s]tanding alone,
historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,”
id. at 783, the Court considered the mass of historical evidence relating to chaplains’
prayers before both federal and state legislatures to be dispositive of the Establishment
Clause issue. As the Court said, “[t]he opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and traditions
of this country. From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever
since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of
disestablishment and religious freedom.” Id. at 786.
3 Marsh is sometimes fitted into a line of cases said to permit the government to
“acknowledge” religion without, however, preferring or endorsing it. See, e.g., Van Orden
v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861-62 (2005) (plurality op.); Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment);
Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 120 S. Ct. 2706, 2709
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 669, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). On another reading of the case,
Marsh “made legislative prayer a field of Establishment Clause jurisprudence with its
own set of boundaries and guidelines.” Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 426 (2005). Most
recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that Marsh dealt with a “special instance[].”
McCreary County of Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 n.10 (2005).
There has been no lack of commentators criticizing Marsh. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Curry, Farewell to Christendom: The Future of Church and State in America 83 (2001);
Bruce P. Merenstein, Last Bastion of School Sponsored Prayer? Invocations at Public
School Board Meetings: The Conflicting Jurisprudence of Marsh v. Chambers and the
School Prayer Cases, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1035, 1062-77 (1997); Edwin Chereminsky,
History, Tradition, The Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44 Hastings L. J.
901, 906 (1993); Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and
3become increasingly controversial.4 If a legislative chaplain
may pray, then he or she will naturally be disposed to draw on
the imagery, language, symbolism or sacred writings of his or
her own faith. But if so, is there not a risk that the legislature
will be seen to be endorsing such prayer,5 or to have created
an illegitimate preference for a particular religion?6 On the
the Public Church, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 293, 338 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, On Reading
the Constitution, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 359, 362 (1988); Gary J. Simpson, The
Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72
Cornell L. Rev. 905, 928-29 (1987); Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the
Establishment Clause, 95 Yale L. J. 1237 (1986); Note, Separation and Accommodation
of Church and State, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1983). Nonetheless, Marsh remains
settled law. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1115
(S.D. Indiana 2005), app. pending.
4 Marsh itself opened the door to later questions by intimating that the practice of
legislative prayer might be challenged in circumstances indicating that “the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief.” 463 U.S. at 794-95.
5 The “endorsement test” is associated with the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of
former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. See, e.g., City of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The “endorsement test” was subjected to devastating criticism in Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 147-57, 165, 192-93 (1992).
For representative evaluations, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Tribute to Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1251, 1254 (2006); Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering
Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to
Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75
Notre Dame L. Rev. 433, 513-17, 545-48 (1999); Steven D. Smith, Symbols,
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No
Endorsement” Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1987); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The
Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1049 (1986); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 351-53
(1986).
6 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1130-31
(1990) (summarizing historical evidence supporting judicial condemnation of
denominational preferences).
4other hand, if the legislature itself scripts or censors the
chaplain’s prayer, does that not risk creating an impermissible
governmental orthodoxy? As Justice Hugo Black once wrote,
“government in this country, be it state or federal, is without
power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which
is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program
of governmentally sponsored religious activity.”7
Faced with such concerns, some courts and other
governmental bodies have concluded that legislative chaplains’
prayer, to be constitutional, must be “non-sectarian” -- and, in
particular, must avoid invoking the name of Jesus.8
7 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
8 For the spectrum of positions, see Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 426 (2005) (county aspired
to inclusiveness and non-sectarianism and accordingly requested that invocations
refrain from using the name of Jesus); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina,
376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2990 (2005) (town council violated
Establishment Clause in opening council sessions with prayers that frequently included
references to Jesus Christ; permissibility of prayer in the Judaeo-Christian tradition did
not include prayer that invoked name of Jesus); Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education,
171 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999) (Board’s practice of opening meetings with moment of
silence or with prayers, many of which made specific reference to the name of Jesus,
was unconstitutional); North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Fdn. v. Constangy,
947 F.2d 1145, 1147-49 (4th Cir. 1991) (prohibiting state judge’s practice of opening
court sessions with prayer invoking “our Father in Heaven”); Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.
Supp.2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (Indiana House of Representatives violated
Establishment Clause by having sessions opened with prayers that frequently invoked
the name of Jesus or emphasized Christian doctrine relating to him); Hinrichs v.
Bosma, No. 105CV0813, 2005 WL 3544300 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 28, 2005) (permitting prayer
in names of God, Allah and Elohim, but not of Jesus); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Ga.,
410 F. Supp.2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (brief explicit references to Christian faith in
invocations at openings of county commission or county commission planning sessions
insufficient to show proselytization or favoritism); Rubin v. City of Burbank, 101 Cal.
App.4th 1194, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 867 (2d Dist. 2002), modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 7,
5Controversies over the contents of public prayers by military
chaplains – though raising different issues from legislative
chaplains’ prayers9 -- have resulted (thus far) in similar
outcomes.10
At first sight, this approach seems to avoid both horns of
the dilemma sketched above. On the one hand, “non-
sectarian” prayer is conceived to be prayer of a kind that can
be said or heard by anyone – or at any rate, by virtually
2002) (prayer by chaplain at city council meeting that invoked the name of Jesus
violated Establishment Clause; trial court order requiring council to advise prayer givers
at council meetings that sectarian prayers were impermissible was not unconstitutional
censorship); Marsa v. Wernik, 86 N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (1981) (no constitutional
violation found when borough council meeting opened with non-denominational
invocations that gave thanks to or sought guidance from a deity). For commentary, see
Note, Constitutional Law—Establishment Clause—Fourth Circuit Holds That Local
Government May Restrict The Leading Of Its Invocations To Representatives Of Judaeo-
Christian Religions.—Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 404 F.3d
276 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 426 (2005), 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1223 (2006); Note,
Constitutional Law—Establishment Clause—Tenth Circuit Holds That City May Deny
Opportunity To Deliver Proselytizing Legislative Prayers.—Snyder v. Murray City Corp.,
159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (En Banc), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Mar. 29,
1999) (No. 98-1193), 112 Harv. L. Rev. 2025 (1999). See generally Adelle M. Banks,
“Should ‘Jesus’ Name’ Be Scratched From Public Prayers?,” The Pew Forum on Religion
& Public Life (April 14, 2006), available at
http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10367.
9 See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (institution of military chaplaincies,
which was founded by Continental Congress and repeatedly authorized by Congress, is
designed to accommodate religious needs of military personnel and their families and
does not in general violate Establishment Clause). The question of military chaplains’
prayers will not be considered in this paper.
10 See Sarah Pulliam, “Military Culture War: Armed services debate prayer ‘in Jesus’
name.’”, Christianity Today (April 2006), available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/004/3.23.html. In response to prior
restrictions on chaplains’ prayer, the United States Air Force issued “Revised Interim
Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force” on February 9, 2006.
The Interim Guidelines provided in part that “non-denominational, inclusive prayer or a
moment of silence may be appropriate for military ceremonies or events of special
importance when its primary purpose is not the advancement of religious beliefs”
(emphasis added). See Asha Puttalah, “Air Force relaxes guidelines on religious
expression,” available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/02/air-force-
relaxes-guidelines-on.php (linking to Interim Guidelines).
6anyone from among the vast majority of the American people –
without causing offense. Further, precisely because “non-
sectarian” prayer purports to transcend the differences
between particular sects or denominations, a legislature can
allow such prayer without appearing to prefer or endorse any
one of them. On the other hand, “non-sectarian” prayer is
considered to remain prayer – only prayer that is more
inclusive in its reach, and less closely associated with any
particular faith, than sectarian prayer. Because it seeks to
express only what is common to all -- or at least the most
dominant -- faith traditions, chaplains from different
backgrounds should be willing and able to recite “non-
sectarian” prayers without damage to their own, more
specifically denominational, beliefs. “Non-sectarian” prayer
thus appears to offer a way of sustaining the tradition of
legislative prayer – and thus of following Marsh – without
compromising the value of governmental “neutrality” in
matters of religion.11
11 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (The “clearest command” of the
Religion Clause is that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another”).
7OVERVIEW
Three Problems With Mandating “Non-Sectarian” Prayer
And a Proposed Solution
The central argument of this paper is that the “solution”
just outlined is spurious. There are three main reasons for
that conclusion: first, the idea of “non-sectarian” prayer is
illusory; second, a mandate prescribing that legislative prayer
be “non-sectarian” would discriminate against many
conscientious clergy of different faiths; and third, such a
mandate would itself threaten to cause an Establishment
Clause violation. Parts II, III and IV below will develop these
arguments in detail.12 Part V will outline a solution that
appears to avoid these three problems, to be constitutionally
valid, and to have independent merits of its own. The
problems and their solution are, in brief, as follows.
1. The illusion of “non-sectarian” prayer
First, the purported distinction between “sectarian” and
“non-sectarian” prayer is illusory. Every prayer, by its very
12 More generally, the demand that legislative prayer, to be permissible at all, must be
“non-sectarian” reflects the underlying thought, regrettably found in much of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, that while “a little religion in our public life” is
tolerable, “the religion must be tamed, cheapened, and secularized.” McConnell, supra
n. --, at 127. See also id. at 134 (“[T]he two sides on the Warren and Burger Courts
shared a conception that everything touched by government must be secular.”).
8nature, reflects and conveys a particular system of beliefs
about the nature of ultimate reality, and is thus “sectarian.”
However inclusionary or ecumenical a prayer is intended to be,
it necessarily incorporates a particular theological viewpoint or
belief, just as a statement in Esperanto remains a statement
in a particular language (Esperanto), however artificial and
contrived that language might be.
Further, given the “dizzying religious heterogeneity of our
Nation,”13 there simply can be no such thing as prayer that
13 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 34-5 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in judgment). Although the United States is unquestionably the most religiously diverse
nation on earth, many Americans remain unaware of the extent to which the religious
nature of the population has changed in recent decades. “We are surprised to find that
there are more Muslim Americans than Episcopalians, more Muslims than members of
the Presbyterian Church, USA, and as many Muslims as there are Jews – that is, about
six million. We are astonished to learn that Los Angeles is the most complex Buddhist
city in the world, with a Buddhist population spanning the whole range of the Asian
Buddhist world from Sri Lanka to Korea, along with a multitude of native-born
American Buddhists. Nationwide, this whole spectrum of Buddhists may number
about four million.” Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian
Country” Has Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation 2-3 (2002). Further,
the more “traditional” American religions, including Christianity, have undergone
dramatic transformations at the same time. “The face of American Christianity has also
changed, with large Latino, Filipino, and Vietnamese Catholic communities; Chinese,
Haitian, and Brazilian Pentecostalist communities; Korean Presbyterians, Indian Mar
Thomas, and Egyptian Copts. In every city in the land church signboards display the
meeting times of Korean or Latino congregations that nest within the walls of old urban
Protestant and Catholic churches.” Id. at 4.
According to some studies, between 1990 and 2000 the Moslem population of
this country grew 109%, the Buddhist population 170%, and the Hindu population
237%. In 2004, there were an estimated 1,558,068 American Moslems, 1,527,019
Buddhists, and 1,081,051 Hindus. Only two other religions included more than
1,000,000 American adherents in 2004: Christianity (224,437,959) and Judaism
(3,995,371). Other rapidly growing religions in the United States include Baha’i, New
Age, and Sikhism. See Largest Religious Groups in the United States of America,
available at http://www.adherents.com/rel__USA.html (citing the work of City
University of New York sociologists Barry A. Kosmin, Seymour P. Lachman and others,
9expresses a “common denominator” for our society. As Dean
Geoffrey Stone wrote almost a quarter century ago, “the very
concept of a ‘nondenominational prayer’ is self-contradictory.
There are well over fifty different theistic sects in the United
States, each of which has its own tenets regarding the
appropriate nature and manner of prayer. Any effort to
compose a truly nondenominational prayer must thus
produce, at best, a sterile litany virtually devoid of true
religious meaning.14 Other scholars writing more recently
agree fully with that judgment.15 Both across and within the
many faith traditions in the United States, profound and
available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_briefs/aris_index.htm). Other
estimates give significantly higher figures for the American Moslem population. See id.
14 Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev.
823, 829 (1983).
15 These scholars have stressed the impossibility of arriving at a “common denominator”
of belief in the circumstances of contemporary American religious pluralism. See, e.g.,
John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Public Religion, 32 Cap. U. L. Rev. 499, 515
(2004) (denying the possibility of “a public religion of the common denominator” and
stating, “[i]n the religiously heterogeneous environment of our day—with more than
1,000 incorporated denominations on the books—no such effective common religion can
be readily devised or defended.”); William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public
Religious Expression in Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev.
11, 19 (2002) (“Religious traditions in the United States are immensely diverse. The
possibility of finding a common denominator underlying all belief systems is virtually
impossible. Any public expression of religious affirmation will inevitably fail to be
comprehensive. And those groups whose religious beliefs are outside the governmental
practice will fairly be able to claim that the government has engaged in sectarian
preference to their detriment.”); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion
Clauses, 81 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 146, 163 (1986) (arguing against government-
prescribed public school prayers, “even of ‘lowest common denominator’ religion,”
because they “must inevitably favor not just religion over nonreligion, but one religion
or group of religions – probably the majority’s – over the others”).
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intractable differences exist as to the nature and
characteristics of the “Supreme Being or . . . Supreme
Reality”16 addressed through prayer. Thus, prayers within
each of the three leading monotheistic religions -- Judaism,
Christianity and Islam -- embody certain conceptions about
the nature of God and his dealings with the world that are
inconsistent with conceptions of ultimate reality held in other
religious traditions.17 Jewish, Christian, and Moslem prayers
based on the conception of a unitary and transcendent God
reject pantheistic or immanentist conceptions of divinity, such
as those found in some forms of Buddhism or Hinduism.
Prayers addressed to a personal God who hears human
petitions and who intervenes in human affairs will “exclude”
the followers of faith traditions that take ultimate reality to be
impersonal, or that believe petitionary prayer to be useless.18
16 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (plurality op.).
17 Nontheistic religions are clearly “religions” within the meaning of the First
Amendment. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the
Religion Clauses: 41 Stan. L. Rev. 233, 251, 257-58 (1989).
18 “Without the presupposition that prayer changes the will of God in some respect,
whether he hears or rejects the prayer, no prayer of supplication seems to be
meaningful.” Paul Tillich, Biblical Reality and The Search for Ultimate Reality 80
(1955).
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Furthermore, even the attempt to find forms of prayer
that could accommodate the three main monotheistic religions
alone would be problematic, if not impossible.19 Prayer -- even
within the limits of monotheism alone -- is dense with
thought, imagery, and allusions that cannot be neatly parsed
out into “sectarian” and “non-sectarian” elements, or
decomposed into portions that do or do not “exclude”
alternative monotheistic viewpoints. Not surprisingly, Jews
pray as Jews, Christians as Christians, Moslems as Moslems.
Conceptions of God, His nature and His dealings with the
world that are widely shared within one monotheistic tradition
but not within another are embedded in virtually every prayer
that pious followers of those traditions would be apt to say.
Thus, certain strict Jewish and Moslem conceptions of God’s
oneness or unitariness will “exclude” traditional Christian
trinitarianism.20 Conversely, Christian conceptions of God as
19 Marsh rejected the argument that the legislative prayers at issue in that case violated
the Establishment Clause because “the prayers are in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.”
463 U.S. at 793. See also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. at 2862 n.7 (plurality op.).
Extrapolating from that aspect of the case, one might argue that prayers within a
monotheistic “Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition” could also pass constitutional review.
See generally Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (2006).
20 In Islamic theology, “[a] ‘polytheist’ (mushrik) is anyone who makes anyone or
anything a ‘partner’ (sharik) with God; the term extends to Jews and Christians, indeed
to all unbelievers.” Michael Cook, The Koran: A Very Short Introduction 34 (2000).
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a Father who brings redemption only through his Son Jesus
will “exclude” Jews and Moslems.21 Yet these conceptions will
guide and inform the prayers that Jewish, Christian and
Moslem chaplains will say.
Further, any effort to identify commonly acceptable
elements of prayer and authorize their use before legislative
bodies would involve the secular courts in monitoring and
regulating the contents of prayers in ways that lie beyond the
institutional competence (and perhaps even the constitutional
jurisdiction) of those courts. Marsh itself prudently warned
the courts not to “embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse
the content of a particular prayer.”22
“[T]he one unforgivable sin is shirk, associating other beings with God in worship.”
William Montgomery Watt, Companion to the Qur’an 65 (1994). According to a leading
Moslem scholar and expositor of Islam, the Koran repeatedly “show[s] up the dangerous
silliness of humans who come either to equate or identify finite beings with the Infinite
one, or to posit intermediary gods or powers between Him and His creation.” Fazlur
Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an 7 (1989). The Moslem doctrines, which trace
back to the Koran, are aimed against the Christian doctrine that Jesus was the Son of
God. See Koran 4:48; 4:171; 23:91.
21 See Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry 150 (Naomi Goldblum trans.
1992) (Christian worship of a God “one of whose attributes is being the father of a son”
puts Christians, in some Jewish views, “outside the tradition of a people who direct
their worship toward the God of Israel”). This does not mean, however, that Jews do
not regard God as a father or pray to him in that manner. See Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, A
Guide to Jewish Prayer 10 (2000).
22 463 U.S. at 795. See Note, supra n.--, 119 Harv. L. Rev. at 1229 (“[T]he [Marsh]
Court concluded that judicial review of the content of legislative prayer should be
extremely minimal”); Maddigan, supra n.--, at 338 (The Court in Marsh “did not seize
on th[e] distinction [between sectarian and non-sectarian prayer] . . . because of its
reluctance to scrutinize the content of the prayer”).
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It is no answer to these arguments to say that while there
may be no tenable distinction between “sectarian” and “non-
sectarian” prayer from the perspective of the theologian, there
is one from the perspective of the constitutional lawyer.23 The
attempt to restrict prayers to a particular, State-approved kind
unavoidably implicates both religious and legal considerations:
they are knotted together both in logic and in practice.
Because the distinction between “sectarian” and “non-
sectarian” prayer is rooted in the contents of prayer and the
beliefs that prayer expresses, it is a theological distinction;
because it is also aimed at preventing offense to members of
the political community who do not share the prayer-giver’s
beliefs, it is a political or constitutional distinction. It must,
accordingly, be both at once, because the hearer’s
interpretation of the contents of the prayer is precisely what
underlies any offense that the prayer causes to that hearer.
23 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish Congress in Support of Appellees,
Hinrich v. Bosma, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Case No. 05-
4604; 05-5781 at 10 (June 12, 2006) (“As a matter of constitutional law, there is an
obligatory principle of non-sectarianism or non-denominationalism. It runs like a
thread through cases involving public or civic religion. Compliance is not measured by
the doctrinally sensitive calipers of the theologian . . . but by the practical yardstick of
the lawyer or judge seeking to determine the public implications of particular religious
formulas.”).
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To see this more clearly, consider the situation of a judge
who is reviewing an Establishment Clause claim brought by a
Buddhist group that legislative prayer invoking “God” is
sectarian and, therefore, unconstitutional. At a minimum, the
judge would need some understanding both of how the term
“God” functions in theistic doctrine and worship, and of how
the relevant form of Buddhism interprets the ultimate nature
of reality, so that references to “God” will import assumptions
incompatible with, and offensive to, Buddhist teaching and
practice. The judge cannot simply look at the external,
behavioristic facts that a speech act occurred and that some
part of the audience took offense at it: indeed, without some
analysis of the religious content of the speech act, the judge
could not even identify the speech as a potential Establishment
Clause violation. The contrary view leads to the absurd
conclusion that any speech marking the commencement of
legislative business could be actionable under the
Establishment Clause if enough members of the audience
claimed to find it religiously offensive – even if the speech
15
invoked “the Great Pumpkin” or “Richard Nixon” rather than
“God.”
Further, the persistent failure of efforts to produce “non-
sectarian” prayers – prayers that seek to avoid giving offense
by minimizing the contents that could be identified with any
particular faith or creed – attests to the unbreakable link in
practice between religious and constitutional aspects of public
prayer. The “Regents’ Prayer” invalidated in Engel v. Vitale
said merely: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our Country.”24 The graduation prayer that
was challenged successfully in Lee v. Weisman was as
anodyne.25 Even the bare phrase “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance gave offense to some religious groups.26 If there is
a coherent constitutional – but not theological – distinction
between “sectarian” and “non-sectarian” prayers, then why do
controversies like these recur so routinely, and why are they
so deeply felt? If there is such a thing as “nonsectarian
24 370 U.S. at 422.
25 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1992).
26 See Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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prayer,” then why has it been so difficult to produce one? The
search for a universally acceptable, “non-sectarian” prayer has
been, and remains, the futile quest for a non-existent Holy
Grail.
2. The discriminatory effects of mandating
“non-sectarian” legislative prayer
Second, the attempt to find a generally acceptable, “non-
sectarian” prayer is intended, in part, to avoid the risk that
legislative prayer will discriminate against particular religions.
Yet perversely, the insistence that legislative prayer be “non-
sectarian” is itself certain to have unfair and discriminatory
effects. (Indeed, the very term “non-sectarian” has a history as
a euphemistic reference to liberal Protestantism, as opposed to
Roman Catholicism and Evangelical Christianity.27) Faced with
the choice of praying in conformity with a government-
imposed standard of orthodoxy or not praying at all, many
clergy (to their credit) will choose not to pray at all. By
preventing them from praying in accordance with the deepest
27 See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 223 & n.83, 339 & n.9, 418 &
n.62, 455-56 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism and
Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U.
Chi. Legal F. 123, 138.
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and most vital traditions of their faiths, courts that mandate
only “non-sectarian” legislative prayer are effectively barring
such chaplains from praying at all.
Consider some of the practical limitations of a judicial
ruling that legislative chaplains could only give “non-
sectarian” prayers. Any such mandate would call into question
(to say no more) whether a Mormon elder could read from the
Book of Mormon; whether a Moslem imam could quote from
the Koran or from the hadiths28 relating to Mohammed;
whether a Christian minister or priest could invoke the name
of Jesus or recite passages from the New Testament; whether a
rabbi could pray from the Hebrew Bible or Jewish liturgy.
Traditional and hallowed forms of prayer that conveyed what a
secular court found to be unacceptably “sectarian”
associations, such as the Christian Lord’s Prayer29 or the
Jewish Shema,30 would be ruled out. Given the multitude of
28 “Next to the Qur’n itself, the most important Islamic textual material is the Hadth:
the body of transmitted actions and sayings of the Prophet [Mohammed] and his
Companions.” John Alden Williams (ed.), Islam 57 (1962).
29 Matt. 6:9-13; Luke 11:2-4. For interpretations of the Lord’s Prayer and its
significance in Christian worship, see, e.g., N.T. Wright, The Lord and His Prayer (1996);
Karl Barth, Prayer 22-66 (W.L. Jenkins trans. 2002); The Catholic Encyclopedia, art.
“The Lord’s Prayer,” available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09356a.htm.
30 “The Shema is a declaration of faith, a pledge of allegiance to One God, an affirmation
of Judaism. . . . [I]t is the expression of Jewish conviction, the historic proclamation of
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theological differences within even a single confessional
tradition and the extreme sensitivities surrounding them,
references to God as “Father,” “Lord” or “King” might well have
to be considered constitutionally suspect, or indeed forbidden.
A judicial effort to purge legislative prayer of any specifically
sectarian or denominational associations must ineluctably
tend towards the secularization of such prayer. In those
circumstances, many conscientious clergy will surely find
themselves unable to pray as legislative chaplains.
3. Mandating “non-sectarian” prayer as a potential
Establishment Clause violation
Third, in practice, the requirement that legislative prayer
be “non-sectarian” will itself tend to bring about an
unconstitutional “establishment” of “religion.” In other words,
the attempted cure may itself aggravate the disease. The risk
may arise in either of two ways. First, what the courts
Judaism’s central creed.” Rabbi Hayim Halevy Donin, To Pray As A Jew: A Guide to
the Prayer Book and the Synagogue Service 144 (1980). The first line of the Shema is
“Hear O Israel! The Lord is our God, the Lord alone” (Deut. 6:4) (Jewish Publication
Society Tanakh Translation). That verse “is repeated throughout the prayer services. It
is said in morning blessings, in the musaf Amidah of Shabbat and holidays, when the
Torah is taken out of the Ark on Shabbat and holidays, as a bedtime prayer, as part of
the deathbed confessional, and at various other times. . . . Jewish law requires a greater
measure of concentration on the first verse of the Shema than on the rest of the prayer.
People commonly close their eyes or cover them with the palm of their hand while
reciting it to eliminate every distraction and to help them concentrate on the meaning of
the words.” Shira Schoenberg, “The Shema,” available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/shema.html.
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perceive as “non-sectarian” will likely prove to be highly
sectarian, or even coercive, from other perspectives. What
passes for the “non-sectarian” is often only “the familiar.”
Thomas J. Curry, a Roman Catholic bishop and a leading
Religion Clause scholar, makes this point effectively in
connection with the debate over public displays of the Ten
Commandments:
[Some] supporters of government sponsored religion pin
their hopes on “nonsectarian” beliefs and practices. They
appear to assume that there exists an innermost core
common to all religious faiths, adherence to which
coerces none. Tending to equate religion with moral
teaching, and centering their beliefs on the Ten
Commandments, they cannot understand . . . how
government sponsorship of either could possibly violate
religious freedom.
For many believers, however, the very selection of the Ten
Commandments rather than, for example, the Beatitudes
or the New Commandment of Christ as the fundamental
underpinning of religious behavior is to embrace a
specific religious perspective. An approach that
supporters of government-sponsored religion perceive as
nonsectarian actually connects with religious
controversies that go back to the beginning of
Christianity.[31]
A mandate for “non-sectarian” prayer may also pose a
significant Establishment Clause issue in a second way.
31 Curry, supra n.--, at 78.
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Legislatures and courts might conclude that “non-sectarian
prayer” would not cause an Establishment Clause violation
because such prayer expressed either mere “ceremonial
deism”32 or its more robust cousin, “civil religion.”33 But
rather than being escape routes, both of these attempted
solutions prove to be dead ends.
The concept of “ceremonial deism” first surfaced in
Supreme Court case law in Lynch v. Donnelly, when Justice
Brennan, in dissent, suggested that “the designation of ‘In God
We Trust’ as our national motto, or the references to God
contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be
understood . . . as [] form[s of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected
from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have
lost through rote repetition any significant religious content.”34
On this account, prayers that are merely forms of ceremonial
deism are “uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular
32 See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1996).
33 See Mirsky, supra n.--; Maddigan, supra n--.
34 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even earlier, however,
in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21, Justice Black had distinguished between
“patriotic or ceremonial occasions” in which a Supreme Being was invoked and
“unquestioned religious exercise[s].”
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purposes as solemnizing public occasions.”35 In Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow, Justice O’Connor cautioned,
however, that “only in the most extraordinary circumstances
could actual worship or prayer be defended as ceremonial
deism,” and commented that “[a]ny statement that has as its
purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of
mind, or that is intended to create a spiritual communion or
invoke divine aid, strays from the legitimate secular purposes
of solemnizing an event and recognizing a shared religious
history.”36 Nonetheless, she identified Marsh as a sui generis
case in which prayer in the form of ceremonial deism could be
“upheld . . . against Establishment Clause challenge” because
it “was supported by an extremely long and unambiguous
history.”37
“Civil religion” is, purportedly, “an essentially secular,
political phenomenon” that must be contrasted with
“traditional, sacral religion.”38 Although the idea of “civil
35 465 U.S. at 717.
36 542 U.S. at 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
37 Id.
38 Mirsky, supra n.--, at 1237; see also Maddigan, supra n.--, at 323 (“The God
acknowledged in civil religion’s rituals is not the God of any traditional religion. Civil
religion’s prayers are not the prayers of any particular church. No doctrine of
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religion” appears to have originated with Jean-Jacques
Rousseau,39 the concept of American “civil religion” gained
prominence in a 1967 article by the sociologist Robert N.
Bellah.40 According to Bellah,
there are . . . certain common elements of religious
orientation that the great majority of Americans share.
These have played a crucial role in the development of
American institutions and still provide a religious
dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including
the political sphere. This public religious dimension is
expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that I
am calling American civil religion.[41]
Bellah found evidence of American civil religion in the
public statements and other writings of the American
founders, including George Washington’s first Inaugural
Address, his proclamation of a day of public thanksgiving on
‘traditional’ religion is promoted or offended by these invocations. The God of the civil
religion is sui generis.”).
39 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book 4, ch. 8 (1762), in The Social
Contract and The Discourses (G.D.H. Cole trans., rev’d and augmented, J.H. Brumfitt
and John C. Hall 1973). Rousseau, however, acknowledged his debt to Thomas
Hobbes.
40 Other writers before Bellah had anticipated his ideas in various ways. One such
writer was Will Herberg, whose 1955 book Protestant, Catholic, Jew developed the idea
of “a civic faith.” But for our purposes, the single most important figure intervening
between Rousseau and Bellah was the great 19th century French sociologist Émile
Durkheim. In his classic The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Joseph Ward
Swain trans. 1963), Durkheim argued that the system of beliefs and practices with
regard to the sacred that constituted a society’s “religion” gave the society its distinctive
unity and personality. For Durkheim, every society has such a constitutive sacral
identity. Durkheim was a direct and powerful influence on Bellah. For a brilliant
summary of Durkheim’s views of religion and their relevance to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American
Experience of Religious Freedom 213-16 (1998).
41 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” originally published in 67 Daedalus 1
(1967), available at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/Bellah/articles__5.htm.
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October 3, 1789, his Farewell Address, Thomas Jefferson’s
second Inaugural Address and Benjamin Franklin’s
Autobiography. Important later statements included Abraham
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and his second Inaugural
Address. According to Bellah, American civil religion has
consistently furnished language and imagery for Presidential
inauguration speeches, was celebrated on occasions such as
Memorial Day and Thanksgiving Day, and was expressed in
public places and memorials such as the Arlington National
Cemetery. In characterizing American civil religion, Bellah
wrote that
[t]hough much is selectively derived from Christianity,
this religion is clearly not itself Christianity. . . . The God
of the civil religion is not only rather “unitarian,” he is
also on the austere side, much more related to order,
law, and right than to salvation and love. Even though
he is somewhat deist in cast, he is by no means simply a
watchmaker God. He is actively involved and interested
in history, with a special concern for America. . . . What
we have, then, from the earliest years of the republic is a
collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to
sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity. This
religion – there seems no other word for it – while not
antithetical to and indeed sharing much in common with




Bellah acknowledged that critics of American civil religion
might dismiss it as merely an ‘“American Shinto;’” but he
defended it “at its best [a]s a genuine apprehension of
universal and transcendent religious reality as seen in or, one
could almost say, as revealed through the experience of the
American people.”43
One might argue that “non-sectarian” legislative prayer
(assuming that the concept is coherent) is compatible with the
Establishment Clause either because (as Justice O’Connor
suggested) such prayer amounted to inoffensive ceremonial
deism, or else because it “exemplif[ied] American civil
religion.”44 Yet taking either course would lure the courts into
significant Establishment Clause problems rather than
providing an escape from them. Although the modern
Supreme Court has never comprehensively defined “religion”
for purposes of the First Amendment,45 it would be plausible to
43 Id.
44 Maddigan, supra n.--, at 338 (discussing how Marsh should have been decided).
45 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1187 (3d ed.
2006). For surveys of judicial attempts at definition of “religion” or the “religious”, see
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 201-210 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in the
result); Ingber, supra n.--, at 251-67; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. 753, 772-76 (1984); Note, Toward A Constitutional
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consider American civil religion to be a “religion” in the
constitutional sense.46 (We have seen that Bellah concedes
that civil religion is truly a “religion.”). Given how close to the
ground the courts have set the trip-wire for “establishing” a
“religion,”47 the judicially-mandated observance of civil religion
in legislative prayer could therefore plausibly be found to be
an unconstitutional “establishment.” Moreover, as we shall
see, civil religion is indeed “antithetical” to other, traditional
religions, and a mandate subjecting legislative prayer to the
Definition of Religion, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056, 1060-63 (1978). In general, however, the
courts seem to be reluctant to attempt a definition. Thus, an able Second Circuit panel
led by Judge Augustus Hand, joined by Judges Clark and Frank, found it “unnecessary
to attempt a definition of religion” because “the content of the term is found in the
history of the human race and is incapable of compression into a few words.” United
States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
46 Certainly, the Supreme Court has not limited the application of the Religion Clause to
“traditional” or “sacral” faiths. One appellate court has remarked that the Court “has
recognized atheism as equivalent to a ‘religion’ for purposes of the First Amendment on
numerous occasions, most recently in McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., ---U.S. ----, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005). . . . [T]he Court has adopted a broad
definition of ‘religion’ that includes non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as theistic
ones. Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 [(1961)], it . . . specifically included
‘Secular Humanism’ as an example of a religion. Id. at 495 n.11.” Kaufman v.
McCaughtry, 469 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees
of Perdue University, 260 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) (“a public university
that had a policy of promoting atheism, or Satanism, or secular humanism . . . would
be violating the religion clauses of the First Amendment”); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197
(3d Cir. 1979) (public school course in transcendental meditation violated
Establishment Clause).
47 As Justice Thomas has noted, “th[e] Court’s precedent permits even the slightest
public recognition of religion to constitute an establishment of religion.” Van Orden v.
Perry, 125 S. Ct. at 2866 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Thomas noted, one
lower federal court has held that a cross erected on a rock in the Mojave Desert to
honor veterans of the First World War “established” Christianity. “If a cross in the
middle of a desert establishes a religion, then no religious observance is safe from
challenge.” Id. Earlier, Chief Justice Burger sensibly complained that it was
“ridiculous” for the Court to have viewed a moment-of-silence statute as “a step toward
creating an established church.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
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requirements of civil religion would therefore be an
impermissible religious preference.48 Finally, repeated judicial
scrutiny of legislative prayers would become necessary in
order to ensure that their contents remained within the limits
of civil religion (or even those of ceremonial deism).49 Such
continuing monitoring and regulation of the contents of prayer
would surely risk an impermissible “entanglement” between
the government and religion.50
4. Religious pluralism and liberty of conscience
as the elements of a solution
These three basic considerations – that the idea of “non-
sectarian” prayer is illusory; that a mandate prescribing that
legislative prayer be “non-sectarian” would discriminate
against many conscientious clergy of different faiths; and that
such a mandate would itself threaten to cause an
Establishment Clause violation -- provide good reason to reject
any requirement that legislative prayer be “non-sectarian.”
48 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 669 (1984); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952).
49 See Maddigan, supra n.--, at 338 (“a court must always scrutinize the content of a
public prayer, at least to the degree necessary to determine if it is sectarian or used for
proselytization.”).
50 See Thomas Curry, Interpreting the First Amendment: Has Ideology Triumphed Over
History?, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (2003) (“Clearly, the practice would involve
government in the exercise of jurisdiction beyond its competence, in evaluating religious
questions as to what is ‘nonsectarian, nonproseletyzing’ [prayer]”).
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But if legislative prayer may (or must) be “sectarian,” would it
not be likely to place the government in the unconstitutional
position of preferring the particular faith of the chaplain who
prays?
The answer is No. The key ingredients of that answer are
found, first, in the conscious recognition of the vitalizing
pluralism that dominates the American religious scene and,
second, in a deep appreciation for the American tradition of
religious liberty. An approach that combines those two
features will avoid religious discrimination between people of
different creeds while not involving the government in a
constitutionally illegitimate preference for a single faith. “If
members of minority religions (or other cultural groups) feel
excluded by government symbols or speech, the best solution
is to request fair treatment of alternative traditions, rather
than censorship of more mainstream symbols.”51 Legislative
prayer should be rendered in different voices and traditions
that fairly reflect the underlying variety of religions within the
relevant political community. And every representative of a
51 McConnell, supra n.--, at 193.
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different faith who prays before the legislature should be left
free to pray in accordance with his or her conscience. As John
Witte, Jr., puts it:
[t]oday, our public religion must be a collection of
particular religions, not the combination of religious
particulars. It must be a process of open religious
discourse, not the product of an ecumenical distillation.
All religious voices, visions, and values must be heard
and deliberated in the public square. All public religious
services and activities, unless criminal or tortious, must
be given a chance to come forth and compete, in all their
denominational particularity.[52]
In what follows, then, I shall develop in detail each of the
three arguments outlined above against mandating “non-
sectarian” legislative prayer. I shall conclude by outlining an
approach that embraces the use of “sectarian” prayer but that
also generates a constitutionally valid result. First, however, I
shall attempt to situate the debate over legislative prayer in
the larger context of rival understandings of the First
Amendment’s Religion Clause.
I. Situating the Problem of Legislative Prayer:
Why have there been objections to legislative prayer?
After all, as the Court emphasized in Marsh, the practice of
52 Witte, supra n.--, at 517.
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legislative prayer had gone back to the origins of the Republic
and before, and had continued uninterruptedly since then.53
Whether viewing the question as a matter of public
acceptability or of constitutional doctrine, however, history
alone cannot validate a practice in which government and
religion have been intertwined.54 Demands for the
53 The origins of legislative prayer in this country can be traced to at least the opening
meetings of the First Continental Congress, which assembled in Philadelphia on
September 5, 1774. A motion was made the next day to begin daily sessions with a
prayer. The name of a local Philadelphia clergyman, the Rev. Jacob Duché, was
proposed. Objections to the motion were raised by John Jay of New York, a
Congregationalist, and John Rutledge of South Carolina, on the grounds that, “proper
as the act would be,” it was impractical in view of the “diversity of religious sentiments
represented in Congress.” However, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, like Jay a
Congregationalist, rose to defend the motion. Adams said: “I am no bigot. I can hear a
prayer from a man of piety and virtue, who is at the same time a friend of his country. I
am a stranger in Philadelphia, but I have heard that Mr. Duché deserves that character;
and therefore, I move that Mr. Duché, an Episcopalian clergyman, be desired to render
prayers to the Congress tomorrow morning.” On Adams’ suggestion, the motion carried
without further opposition. (The facts and quotations above are drawn from Derek H.
Davis, Religion and the Continental Congress 1774-1789: Contributions to Original
Intent 73-78 (2000)).
Rev. Duché accepted Congress’ invitation and returned the next day, September
7, 1774. John Adams described the event in a diary entry for September 7, 1774:
Went to congress again. Heard Mr. Duche read Prayers. The Collect for the day,
the 7th of the Month, was most admirably adapted, tho this was accidental, or
rather Providential. A Prayer, which he gave us of his own Composition, was as
pertinent, as affectionate, as sublime, as devout, as I ever heard offered up to
Heaven. He filled every Bosom present.
See John Adams diary 22, 4 September – 9 November 1774, available at
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/doc.cfm?id=D22.
Duché’s extemporized prayer, which caused such an “excellent Effect” on
Congress, concluded:
All this we ask in the Name and through the merits of Jesus Christ, Thy Son
and our Savior. Amen.
See “The First Prayer in Congress,” available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi
in/query/r?ammem/rbpe:@field(DOCID+@lit(rbpe0140100a)).
54 See, e.g., Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the
Passage of the First Amendment 218 (1986) (attributing the “discrepancy between the
widespread conviction of late eighteenth-century Americans that government possessed
no power in matters of religion and the persistent interference of government in
religious affairs” to “the cultural and socials context of the time”).
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“separation” of Church and State themselves have a long
history in this country, and run very deep.
Commentators have found several sources or forms of
separationism.55 One major source reflects attitudes towards
religion prevalent in the American Enlightenment, and can be
linked to the figure of Thomas Jefferson.56 The Supreme Court
gave classic if one-sided expression to Enlightenment
separationism in Everson v. Board of Education,57 when it
declared that “[i]n the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of
separation between Church and State.’”58
55 For a careful analysis of different understandings of “separation,” see Douglas
Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1667, 1686-90, 1700-01
(2003); see also Carl H. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary
American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 371, 379-94. The two kinds of separationism
considered here – Enlightenment and Evangelical – are intended to be abstractions or
ideal types, not exactly matching either particular historical views I associate with those
positions, nor exactly the views of the contemporary Supreme Court Justices most
likely to be considered “separationists,” but related to both sets of views. See Brady,
supra n. --, at 509-13; 524-25.
56 For a restatement and defense of this position by two leading scholars, see Isaac
Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution: A Defense of the Secular
State (2005). See also Brady, supra n.--, at 448-60 (analyzing relationship between the
Enlightenment and James Madison’s and Thomas Jefferson’s views concerning
religion). (Then) Justice Rehnquist challenged the historical basis for strict
Enlightenment separationism in his lengthy dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For summaries of scholarly and historical
criticisms of Everson’s separationism, see Brady, supra, at 441-42; H. Wayne House, A
Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion With the Secular
State?, 13 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 203, 266-68 (1999).
57 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
58 Id. at 10; see also id. at 31-2 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The Amendment’s purpose
was not to strike merely at an official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion . .
. . [I]t was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
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Since the publication in 1964 of Mark DeWolfe Howe’s
classic The Garden and The Wilderness: Religion and
Government in American Constitutional History,59 however,
courts and scholars have become aware of another important
variety of separationist thought – what can be called
“Evangelical separationism.”60 If Thomas Jefferson is the
patron saint of Enlightenment separationism, Roger Williams
is that of Evangelical separationism.61 Like Jefferson, Williams
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support for religion.”). For an historical account of the background to the Everson
decision, including the anti-Catholic sentiments of its author, Justice Black, see
Hamburger, supra n.--, at 454-63.
59 Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and The Wilderness: Religion and Government in
American Constitutional History (1964). Later scholars have followed Howe’s lead. See,
e.g., McConnell, supra n.--, at 136 (“It is a mistake to read the Religion Clauses as a
triumph for the forces of Enlightenment secularism. Proponents of religious freedom
were the least secular and most ‘enthusiastic’ of the sects.”).
60 My use of this term may lead oversimplification if it fosters the mistaken belief that
religiously-minded (or Christian) separationists were or are formed from a single mold.
They were not and are not. There is an array of beliefs and strategies here ranging from
radical disengagement from the world to merely maintaining a pronounced detachment
from it. See Michael McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian
Examination of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 191, 194-98 (1992).
For an analysis of the variety of eighteenth century Evangelical (primarily Baptist) views
that influenced the shaping of the Religion Clause, see Brady, supra n.--, at 461-70.
61 “Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode Island . . . has been described as ‘the truest
Christian amongst many who sincerely desired to be Christian,’ . . . [and] was one of the
earliest exponents of the doctrine of separation of church and state.” Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. at 434 n.20. I am using Williams here to represent a strand in Establishment
Clause thought; he was not, in fact, a direct influence on the Framers (although the
leaders and members of the Evangelical churches were). See Laycock, supra n.--, at
1674.
For an account of Williams that emphasizes his interest in the civic equality of
believers (rather than their disengagement from civic affairs), see McConnell, supra n.--,
at 210-11. Other scholars see Williams as a figure obsessed with protecting the purity
of the Church – so much so, that his “division between the spiritual and the worldly”
seemingly left the two spheres “almost irrelevant to each other.” Hamburger, supra n.--
, at 42; see also id. at 50 (Williams “separated himself from all institutionalized religion,
including even that of his fellow Separatists”).
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wished to build a wall of separation between Church and State
– but unlike Jefferson, when Williams did so, “it was not
because he was fearful that without such a barrier the arm of
the church would extend its reach. It was, rather, the dread of
the worldly corruptions which might consume the churches if
sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained.”62
The “wilderness,” as Williams explained in a letter, was the
world:
The faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ,
extant to the world, abundantly proving that the church
of the Jews under the Old Testament in the type, and the
church of the Christians in the antitype, were both
separate from the world; and that when they have opened
a gap in the hedge or the wall of separation between the
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world,
God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the
candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this
day. And that therefore if He will ever please to restore
His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be
walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and
that all that shall be saved out of the world are to be
transplanted out of the wilderness of the world, and
added unto his church or garden.[63]
With a forthrightness that makes him a compelling figure
for many contemporary Christians, Williams condemned the
centuries-old linkage between the Christian Church and the
62 Howe, supra n. --, at 6.
63 Id. at 5-6.
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State that had been forged under the Roman Emperor
Constantine: “The unknowing zeale of Constantine and other
Emperours, did more hurt to Christ Jesus his Crowne and
Kingdome, then the raging fury of the most bloody Neroes.”64
Like those modern Christians, Williams regarded
Constantinianism as a persistent temptation to the Church,65
offering it an unholy bargain in which it exchanges its
authority to witness to and judge the world in return for legal
privileges and political power.66
An anti-Constantinian Christian would likely view
legislative prayer with severe misgivings, if not abhorrence.
Surely the presence of a Christian minister leading prayer at a
ceremonial state occasion such as the opening of legislative
business would open a “gap” in the “hedge” that fences off the
“garden” of the Church from the “wilderness” of the world?
64 Quoted in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 435 n.20.
65 For the recurring pattern of the Constantinian “temptation” through the fourth
century of the Christian Church’s existence until the present, see John Howard Yoder,
The Royal Priesthood: Essays Ecclesiastic and Ecumenical 195-203 (1994). One
should note, however, that the Constantinian temptation has existed in different forms
for non-Christian faiths as well, including Hinduism and Islam. See Arnold Toynbee,
An Historian’s Approach to Religion 104-13 (1956). Legal scholars have been made
familiar with the Christian critique of Constantinianism through the work of H.
Jefferson Powell. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradition of American
Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation (1993).
66 “The Church was, in truth, making with the Empire the wager that Faust had made
with Mephistopheles.” Toynbee, supra n.--, at 108.
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Moreover, if there are constraints, whether formal or informal,
on the prayers that that minister may say – constraints
designed to mitigate the “offensiveness” of the Gospel to the
world, while preserving the air of solemnity that surrounds
true prayer – the scandal of legislative prayer must become
even deeper.
Enlightenment separationism and Evangelical
separationism do not, however, exhaust the range of possible
theological, political and constitutional positions on legislative
(or other public) prayer. Rather, just as separationism
appears in (at least) two forms, so there are two corresponding
views that would permit legislative prayer, albeit subject in
both instances to appropriate conditions. The first view
(which, like Enlightenment separationism, reflects a
predominantly secularist mindset) would permit the public
expression of what one of its exponents has called “a religion
of the republic.”67 The “Religion of the Republic” approach, as
we have seen, would allow for legislative prayer if and insofar
as it amounts to no more than “ceremonial deism” or (and, it
67 Mirsky, supra n.--, at 1253.
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is argued, better) to an American civil religion that “cement[s]
the communal symbolic life of American society.”68 The
alternative view – which is advocated in this paper – would
allow legislative prayer that instead reflects “the religions of the
republic.” Let us call it “the Pluralist Polity approach.”69 In
terms of a common categorization of the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence of recent Supreme Court Justices, the Religion
of the Republic view has strong affinities with the
“endorsement test,” while the Pluralist Polity view has many
features of “accomodationism,” and both are distinct from
“separationism.”70
Sharing much of the anti-Constantinian perspective of
Evangelical separationism, the Plurality Polity approach
regards the “religion of the republic” as an ersatz fabrication –
an attempt to find, or rather to impose, an artificial and
68 Id. at 1255.
69 I borrow the term “Pluralist Polity” from Martin Marty, When Faiths Collide 67-96
(2005). Marty’s insightful discussion of American religious pluralism makes clear that
one can find value in religious pluralism without denying the existence of religious
truth. Civil pluralism does not entail, and should not be collapsed into, theological
pluralism. See id. at 165-67; 171-76. See also Eck, supra n.--, at 69-77
(distinguishing “pluralism” from “diversity,” “tolerance,” and “relativism,” chiefly by
noting that pluralism so understood requires active engagement with other faiths).
70 See Brady, supra n.--, at 509-19 (distinguishing “separationism,” the “endorsement
test,” and “accomodationism,” explaining the unifying themes within each viewpoint
and the bases of their differences from one another, and associating each of them with
the positions of individual Justices).
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synthetic unity on the irremediable religious pluralism of
American life. Rather than treating religious pluralism as
something to be regulated or even suppressed in the
governmental setting, the Plurality Polity approach advocates
that it be given full, open and uninhibited expression.
Like Evangelical separationism, the Pluralist Polity
approach emphasizes the gravity of the act of praying. It
agrees with the great modern Jewish theologian Joseph
Soloveitchik that “to pray has one connotation only: to stand
before God.”71 It too insists that “the very essence of prayer is
the covenantal experience of being together with and talking to
God.”72 It views with abhorrence the idea that public prayer
might be undertaken for purely instrumental or secular
reasons, such as to lend an air of solemnity to a governmental
event or to create “an aesthetic experience rather than a
covenantal one.”73 Where it differs from Evangelical
separationism is in thinking that it is religiously possible to
71 Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith 54 (2004).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 98.
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pray and to witness, purely and even passionately, at the
behest of a governmental body.
The Pluralist Polity approach also has significant
elements in common with Enlightenment separationism and
even with the advocacy of “a religion of the republic.”74 Like
those positions, it sees the Constantinian bargain as doubly
disastrous: the capture of the State by the Church must be
avoided for sound political reasons, just as the capture of the
Church by the State must be avoided for sound theological
reasons.75 It fully accepts that under our constitutional
régime, the State must avoid illegitimate preferences for any
sect or faith tradition: non-discrimination is imperative. It
74 Compare David A.J. Richards, Civil Religion and Constitutional Legitimacy, 29 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 177, 180-81 (1987) (noting objections to Constantinianism by Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison as well as by Roger Williams).
75 In one of its early “Enlightenment separationism” cases, the Supreme Court took
exactly this view, stating that “[t]he first and most immediate purpose [of the
Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally
established religion . . . showed that whenever government had allied itself with one
particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the
hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same
history showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied
upon the support for government to spread its faith.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 431.
The consensus of informed observers seems to be that the American model of
Church-State relations has indeed, over time, proven to be both vitalizing to religion
and beneficial to politics. See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism:
A Double-Edged Sword 60-63 (pb. ed. 1997). But in some critical circumstances, this
has arguably proven not to be so. As Mark Noll has argued in his recent study, The
Civil War as a Theological Crisis (2006), the absence of an overarching religious
authority in this country combined with the religious seriousness of the American
people helped to provoke the Civil War and to intensify its bitterness. See id. at 111,
160-62.
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differs from these more secular-minded approaches chiefly by
seeking to use the fact of American religious pluralism – which
gives rise to the risk of governmental preference and
discrimination – as the means of overcoming that risk. Rather
than attempting to ban religious expression from the public
square altogether, or permitting it to enter only in the
attenuated forms of civil religion or ceremonial deism, it
welcomes it into the public square in all its robustness and
variety.
In the specific context of legislative prayer, the Pluralist
Polity approach begins by denying the tenability of any
attempt to distinguish between constitutionally acceptable
“non-sectarian” prayer and constitutionally unacceptable
“sectarian” prayer. It is no more possible to pray without
invoking a particular conception of the Supreme Being or
Supreme Reality than it would be to speak without using the
conventions of a particular language or sign system. Further,
the Pluralist Polity approach argues that even if a tenable line
could be drawn between “non-sectarian” and “sectarian”
prayers, the effect of enforcing that distinction would be to
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discriminate against those legislative chaplains (and other
prayer-givers) who cannot conscientiously pray without
drawing on the ideas, images, symbols and language of their
own faiths. Finally, the Pluralist Polity approach suggests that
the very effort to enforce a distinction between constitutionally
valid and invalid prayer language may itself entrap the
government in Establishment Clause violations. Accordingly,
the Pluralist Polity approach recommends combining the fact
of American religious pluralism with the tradition of American
religious liberty to find a constitutional solution to the problem
of legislative prayer.
II. Prayer Is Inherently “Sectarian”
There is a fundamental error in the very idea of “non-
sectarian” prayer.76 The idea presupposes that some generic,
“nonsectarian” prayer language can be disengaged from the
76 Despite using the concept frequently, the Supreme Court has failed to provide a
satisfactory definition of “non-sectarian” prayer. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641
(1992), Justice Scalia, in dissent, characterized governmental endorsement as
“sectarian” if it “specif[ied] details upon which men and women who believe in a
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example,
the divinity of Christ.” Apart from the oddness of describing “the divinity of Christ” as a
“detail[]” that distinguished Christianity from other monotheistic faiths, Justice Scalia’s
account could not provide an adequate definition of what makes prayer “sectarian,” if
only because it restricts that concept to religions that assume “a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world.” But a Hindu prayer to Vishnu would
surely be “sectarian,” even though Hinduism does not make that assumption.
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specific faith traditions and forms of worship that give prayer
its vitality, power and inner meaning. That presupposition is
false. Searching for a “non-sectarian” essence of prayer is not
like stripping the husks from an ear of corn to find the kernels
inside; it is like peeling off the layers of an onion until nothing
is left but empty space.77
No prayer can escape making particular claims about the
nature of the divine. Take, for example, the simple three-word
prayer “God bless America.” Most courts would, if asked,
likely consider this prayer to be “non-sectarian.” It is anything
but that. It presupposes a deity who alone is divine, who is
personal, who is willing to hear and respond to human
petitions, who intervenes in human history and indeed
controls its course, who grants or withholds blessings, and
who sits in judgment on the nations.78 These presuppositions
77 It is probably not coincidental that belief in the possibility of winnowing out
“nonsectarian” from “sectarian” prayer closely resembles Thomas Jefferson’s belief that
“what is really [the teaching of Jesus]” is “as separable” from “the rubbish in which it
[wa]s buried” by his followers as removing “the diamond from the dunghill.” Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819), in 15 The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 220 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed. 1904-05).
78 “When we pray to God there are things . . . implicit in our action. First, there is the
acknowledgement that God, albeit all-powerful and the creator of the universe, is not an
impersonal force or source of energy or colossal agent of nature, but is an actual being,
who can be addressed in a meaningful way. Prayer is directed to a personal God, who
receives it and listens to it – and who may answer it. Second, prayer reflects the fact
that our relationship with this personal, receptive God, who hears what we have to say,
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are “sectarian.” They adopt the claims of some religious
traditions and preclude those of others.
Two scholars who have studied the phenomenon of
prayer closely and sympathetically have reached the same
conclusion. They argue:
efforts to distinguish prayer from worship must inevitably
fail. All prayer involves an element of worship, for it
always entails the lower addressing the higher, and this
higher assumes, in the mind of the believer, a particular
form conforming to a particular faith. The “Letter to the
Bishops of the Catholic Church on Some Aspects of
Christian Meditation,” a particularly insightful 1989
Vatican document addressing interfaith prayer, notes
that “Christian prayer is always determined by the
structure of the Christian faith.” So, too, with prayers of
other faiths; thus Hindu prayer to a god of the Hindu
pantheon reflects Hindu theology, Hindu devotional
history, and Hindu ideas about the methodology of
prayer. . . . [T]o burn incense or pray to an image is
always an act of worship, although the import differs
from one faith to the next. Even silence comes under
this rule: the silence of a Buddhist temple is not the
silence of a Christian church, for the silence of each
enclosure swarms with the spiritual gestalt of each
tradition. With this understanding, the borders between
prayer and worship become permeable or evaporate
altogether. . . .
Religion, like cuisine, finds greatness in particularity.
Each religion has its own specific genius, and to lump
is itself direct and personal . . . one-to-one, always.” Paul Johnson, The Quest for God:
A Personal Pilgrimage 184 (1996).
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them together is to risk a tasteless, unnourishing
pudding of faith.[79]
The quest to find some “common denominator” prayer
language will characteristically depend on overlooking two
elementary but essential points: first, the fundamental
difference between monotheistic religions (e.g., Judaism,
Christianity and Islam) and non-theistic religions (Buddhism
in some interpretations, and arguably, Hinduism80); and
second, the existence of ways of understanding and
characterizing “God” that strikingly distinguish the main
monotheistic religions from each other -- and, indeed, that
distinguish believers even within each of the major
monotheistic traditions.
79 Philip Zaleski & Carol Zaleski, Prayer: A History 305-06 (2005).
80 See John Hick, God Has Many Names 53 (1982). On one account, the Hindu belief
that “the divine is not only beyond gender and name, but also beyond number” results
in the manifestation of the divine “in many shapes and forms: as human or animal, as
trees, or as combinations of these things.” Vasudha Narayanan, Hinduism: Origins,
Beliefs, Practices, Holy Texts, Sacred Places 23 (2004). At the same time, Hindu
scriptures also “refer to the supreme being as brahman, which is considered to be
ineffable and beyond all human comprehension.” Id. at 25. Other accounts of
Hinduism emphasize its resemblance to monotheistic traditions. See Nirad C.
Chaudhuri, Hinduism: A Religion to Live By 267(1979) (arguing that “the God of the
[Bhagavad] Gita” came “from Christianity”); see also R.C. Zaehner, Hinduism 92 (1966)
(The Bhagavad Gita is “the most ‘seminal’ of Hindu scriptures.”). Still other interpreters
maintain that while Hindu thought permits a “concrete and representational”
conception of God to those who find in it a “life-sustaining meaning,” the “basic Hindu
view of God” is of “[u]tter reality, utter consciousness, . . . utterly beyond all possibility
of frustration . . . pure being . . . infinite with nothing excluded.” Huston Smith, The
World’s Religions 60-1 (rev. ed. 1991). Hinduism has included “superb champions” of
both “personal and transpersonal conceptions of God.” Id. at 62.
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A. The Distinction Between Theistic and Non-
Theistic Religions.
First, some religious traditions presuppose that ultimate
reality is a personal God (as in monotheism), while other
traditions presuppose that ultimate reality is impersonal.
According to John Hick, the well-known philosopher of
religion, “[m]an’s awareness of the Eternal One—like all our
awareness of reality—is focused by concepts. There are in fact
two different basic involved in the religious life of mankind.
One is the concept of deity, or of the Eternal One as personal,
which presides over the theistic modes of religion; and the
other is the concept of the Absolute, or of the Eternal One as
nonpersonal, which presides over the non-theistic or
transtheistic modes of religion.”81 Thus, Ninian Smart,
another prominent philosopher and student of comparative
religion, has noted that:
81 Hick, supra n.--, at 52.
It must be acknowledged that some thinkers regard the distinction between theistic
and non-theistic religions (or “Judaic” and “Indian” religions) as “not a difference in
view, but one of emphasis.” Toynbee, supra n.--, at 17. As Martin Marty characterizes
this view, it says, in effect: “Strip away the[] overlays and encrustations . . . and you
will find revealed the warm and pulsing heart of all-religions-as-essentially-one.” Marty,
supra n.--, at 166-67. Marty explicitly takes issue with Toynbee’s claims. See id. at
166.
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two varieties at least of Buddhism are very different from
theism: the Theravada . . . and Madhyamika, one of the
mainstream forms of Mahayana Buddhism. . . . It was
not for nothing that the Dalai Lama declared . . . “We
Buddhists are atheists.” . . . [Buddhism] has deep
spiritual books and philosophies. But it is still atheist: it
rejects the notion of a creator God who will help us with
our troubles.[82]
This basic distinction between monotheistic and other
religions undermines the assumption that references to “a
generic ‘God’”83 cannot be construed as promoting a particular
form of religious belief or as excluding the followers of another.
As Justice Clarence Thomas has observed, “words such as
‘God’ have religious significance. . . . [J]ust last Term this
Court had before it a challenge to the recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance, which includes the phrase ‘one Nation under
God.’ Th[is] declaration . . . necessarily entail[s] an affirmation
that God exists. This phrase is thus anathema to those who
reject God’s existence and a validation of His existence to
those who accept it. Telling either nonbelievers or believers
82 Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World’s Beliefs 27
(1996). See also Smith, supra n.--, at 114 (distinguishing ways in which Buddhism
might and might not be considered a form of atheism); Christmas Humphreys,
Buddhism 79 (3d ed. 1962) (“as between the theist and atheist positions, Buddhism is
atheist . . .”).
83 Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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that the words ‘under God’ have no meaning contradicts what
they know to be true.”84 Accordingly, when a Jewish,
Christian or Moslem cleric prays to “God” in a manner that
implies personhood, a Buddhist may reasonably construe him-
or herself to be “excluded” by that prayer. Conversely, a
Buddhist cleric’s prayer quoting the Buddha’s statement,
“Bliss, yes bliss, my friends is nirvana,”85 could reasonably be
considered “exclusionary” by Jews, Christians and Moslems.
In her concurring opinion in Newdow, Justice O’Connor
seemed to reject this line of thought. Directly contradicting an
amicus brief filed on behalf of Buddhist Temples, Centers and
Organizations, she peremptorily concluded there that the
phrase “under God” as used in the Pledge of Allegiance
“represents a tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to
invoke its solemnizing power without favoring any individual
religious sect or belief system.86 But what equips a judge to
find that a public invocation of the divine under a particular
84 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. at 2866 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted.) Even earlier, the Court (Clark, J.) found that Congress had
used the term “Supreme Being” rather than “God” in the Selective Service Act so as to
be certain of “embrac[ing] all religions,” including Buddhism and Hinduism. United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (emphasis added).
85 Quoted in Smith, supra n.--, at 114.
86 542 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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name is “tolerable” to those who sincerely or even poignantly
say that it offends their faith? The Buddhist amici had
contended that “[w]hen children from Buddhist homes . . .
recite the Pledge of Allegiance, they utter a phrase that is
inconsistent and incompatible with the religious beliefs and
ethical principles they are taught by their parents . . . . That
phrase is that this is a nation ‘under God.’ . . . . [W]hen public
school teachers lead children in reciting the Pledge, the
unmistakable message conveyed by the government is that
Buddhism is an outcast religion.”87 When Buddhist groups
contend that the recital of the Pledge in a governmental setting
‘“sends a message to [them as] nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community,’”88 how
can a judge -- especially one from a very different background
– presume to tell them that they are misreading the message?
No doubt Justice O’Connor was right to say that “adapting a
subjective approach” to her favored endorsement test “would
reduce the test to an absurdity.” But the difficulty is not
87 Brief Amicus Curiae of Buddhist Temples, Centers and Organizations Representing
Over 300,000 Buddhist Americans in Support of Respondents, 2004 WL 298116 at *3-
*4.
88 Id. at 34 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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solved by rudely dismissing the Buddhists’ complaint as the
equivalent of “a ‘heckler’s veto’”89: the difficulty lies in the
inherent arbitrariness90 and latent bias91 of the “endorsement
test” itself. Deciding whether a governmental practice
diminishes a religious minority’s sense of belonging to the
larger political community can hardly be, as Justice O’Connor
would have it, a matter of “a community ideal of social
judgment”92 – that is, of viewing the question from an insider’s
89 Id. at 35. Similarly, in her opinion for the Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988), in ruling against the claim of
minority Native American religions that the Forest Service could not constitutionally
construct a logging road over their ancient worship sites (thus effectively destroying
their ability to practice their religions), Justice O’Connor wrote that “government simply
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires.
. . . The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of
them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion.”
90 See McConnell, supra n.--, at 148 (“There is no generally-accepted conception of what
‘endorsement’ is, and there cannot be. . . . It is nothing more than an application to the
Religion Clauses of the principle: ‘I know it when I see it.’”).
91 See id. at 152-54 (arguing that the “endorsement test” is biased both against religion
in general and against non-mainstream religions in particular).
92 Id. As Justice O’Connor wrote elsewhere, the “collective standard” embedded in her
endorsement test requires judgments similar to those of “the reasonable person in tort
law, who is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do
unreasonable things, but is rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable
behavior, determined by the collective social judgment.” Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)(citations and internal quotation marks and brackets
eliminated). But this “collective standard” – like the reasonable person standard in tort
law -- necessarily reflects the values and perspectives of the dominant element in the
community.
Justice O’Connor also interpreted her test as saying that if a governmental
practice was “longstanding” and “nonsectarian,” it would be unlikely to “convey a
message of endorsement of particular religious beliefs.” City of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As (now)
Judge Michael McConnell has pointed out, however, “[i]n our culture, most
‘longstanding’ symbols are those associated with Protestant Christianity, and those
most likely to be perceived as ‘nonsectarian’ are symbols associated with liberal
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perspective. That, of course, skews outcomes in favor of
mainstream – or at least, familiar and well-recognized --
religious opinions and sensibilities.93 A test with such a built-
in bias should not stand.94
B. Differences Between the Main Monotheistic
Religions.
The monotheistic religions differ markedly, not only from
non-theistic and polytheistic religions, but also from each
Protestantism, symbols common to the Jewish and Christian faiths, or symbols
incorporating vague references to an unidentified deity.” McConnell, supra n.--, at 154.
93 As Judge John Noonan has pointed out, the Supreme Court has displayed a similar
unthinking bias in favor of the familiar in past Religion Clause cases. He cites the
example of Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), in which an unanimous Court
brushed aside, without analysis or explanation, the objection to the Selective Draft Law
of 1917 that it exempted members of historic Peace Churches (Quakers and
Mennonites) from conscription, while not creating a similar exemption for sects such as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses that were new at the time to the American religious scene.
Noonan notes that while the historic Peace Churches “were not made to fight[,]
[m]embers of newer sects . . . were prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to prison
because they were not exempted and had failed to comply with the statute establishing
the national norm.” Noonan, supra n.--, at 222.
94 Justice O’Connor’s collective standard for evaluating minority religions’
Establishment Clause claims also cuts against the Court’s current jurisprudence in at
least two ways. First, the Court has recognized the validity of a minority’s claim to be
offended and isolated by a governmental practice even when those who press the claim
are relatively few: indeed, the Court has observed that the very fact that a broad
majority approves the practice may intensify the injury to the minority. See Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 292 (2000). Second, the Court has
treated the absence or rarity of complaints from minority religions about a
governmental practice as evidence of the inoffensiveness of the practice and, hence, as
tending to prove its constitutional legitimacy. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. at
2870 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Noah Feldman, Principle,
History, and Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 Iowa L.
Rev. 833, 863 (1996) (criticizing Court’s practice). Justice O’Connor herself relied on
the same criterion. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 38
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)( “[T]he history of a given practice is all the
more relevant when the practice has been employed pervasively without engendering
significant controversy.”). Accordingly, if a religious minority does in fact complain that
a governmental practice has exclusionary or isolating effects – as the Buddhist groups
did in Newdow -- then the courts should be receptive to that complaint.
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other. Even permitting legislative prayers to a generic “God”
would not bridge over the differences between them. For one
thing, “God” is only one of the names that monotheists give to
the Supreme Being who is the object of their prayer and
worship: invocation of other names – “Yahweh,” “Allah,”
“Jesus” – brings deep differences to light. Furthermore,
monotheistic prayer will necessarily characterize the Supreme
Being in various ways. And virtually any characterization will
introduce an understanding of the Supreme Being that is
embedded in a particular faith tradition. As a practical
matter, therefore, religious particularity cannot be purged from
monotheistic prayer.
Again, we may cite John Hick:
The concept of deity, or of God, takes concrete form, and
a “local habitation and a name,” in the life of a particular
human community and culture as a specific divine
persona or face or image or icon of the Eternal One.
Yahweh of Israel is one such divine persona. He exists in
relationship with the people of Israel, and cannot be
characterized except in that relationship. He has to be
described historically as the God of Abraham, of Isaac
and of Jacob, who brought the children of Israel out of
bondage in Egypt and led them into their Promised Land.
You cannot abstract Yahweh from his historical
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relationship with this particular people. He is part of
their history and they are a part of his.[95]
Courts that would impose a requirement that legislative
prayer be “non-sectarian” likely assume, uncritically but
mistakenly, that prayers may both (1) invoke “God” under that
name or an assumed equivalent (including “Allah”) and yet (2)
be framed so as to abstract “God” (or “Allah”) from any
identifiable association with a particular people, church, faith
tradition, or community of believers.96 That cannot be done.
To illustrate the difficulty, we shall consider whether legislative
prayer may be “non-sectarian” even if invokes the name
“Allah.”
95 Hick, supra, at 52.
96 Thus, Justice O’Connor would apparently have been open to a “religious
acknowledgement” that made “a simple reference to a generic ‘God,’” but not to one that
referred to “Jesus” or “Vishnu.” Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
at 42 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
In general, the courts hold that the use of the term “God” in legislative prayer (or
other contexts) does not, as such, constitute an Establishment Clause violation. By
contrast, prayer references to “Jesus” have not been generally validated. See, e.g.,
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (“the mere fact
that a prayer invokes a particular concept of God is not enough to run foul of the
Establishment Clause”); Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988)
(permitting reference to “God” in legislative resolution); Chaudhuri v. State of
Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997) (allowing reference in challenged prayer to God,
but indicating that explicit or implicit references to Jesus Christ would make prayer
unacceptable); G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental Institutions: The Who,
The What, and the At Which Level, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 299, 350-51 (2001) (“Lower court
decisions reinforce the Marsh holding that a reference to God, standing alone, neither
contaminates a prayer nor removes it from the category of permissible legislative prayer
. . . . What, then, of references to Jesus Christ, Muhammed, Buddha, or other leaders of
particular religious faiths? Here, the verdict is still out in the lower courts.”).
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C. The Name “Allah” and Prayers in the
Islamic Tradition.
“Allah” is, of course, the Arabic name for God, and as
such is used by Arabic speakers, including Christians and
other non-Moslems, to refer to God in prayer or other
discourse.97 It might thus appear to be no more (if no less)
“sectarian” than the name “God” itself. On the other hand, in
contemporary American culture, the term “Allah” surely comes
freighted with specifically Islamic associations; and the use of
that term by a Moslem believer in legislative prayer therefore
seems as “sectarian” as would a Christian’s use of the term
“Jesus.”
The history of the term “Allah” and its use in Moslem
prayer and worship98 shed light on why it, no less than the
term “Jesus,” reflects “sectarian” particularity. “Even before
97 “It is a known fact that every language has one or more terms that are used in
reference to God and sometimes to lesser deities. This is not the case with Allah. Allah
is the personal name of the One true god. Nothing else can be called Allah. The term
has no plural or gender. This shows its uniqueness when compared with the word god
which can be made plurals, gods, or feminine, goddess.” Institute of Islamic
Information and Education (III&E), III&E Brochure Series; No. 2, “Who is Allah?”,
available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/tawheed/conceptofgod.html.
98 Islam distinguishes two main forms of prayer – salt or “ritual” prayer, which is “the
essential element of Muslim worship,” and which is “an assemblage of rites, gestures
and words, laid down by [Islamic] law,” and du’, or “the personal and variable appeal
that is addressed to God.” Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Muslim Institutions 70
(John F. MacGregor trans. 1961).
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Islam, Allah (from al-ilah ‘the god’) was the name of God and
the object of worship; individual men and women—they are
called hanif in the Koran—had already taken the step towards
monotheism.”99 Yet despite that pre-Koranic linguistic usage,
Moslem scholars argue that the Prophet Mohammed infused
the term with new and distinctive content. “It is true that
some [in the Arabian peninsula] had arrived at a monotheistic
conception of religion [before Islam]; but there is absolutely no
reason to believe that their One God was exactly the One God
of Muhammad. For Muhammed’s monotheism was, from the
very beginning, linked up with a humanism and a sense of
social and economic justice whose intensity is no less than the
intensity of the monotheistic idea.”100 Moslem prayer and
worship attach overriding importance to the name “Allah” and
other Koranic names for God, much as Jewish and Christian
traditions do with respect to their names for God. “The Quran
asserts: ‘To God belong the most beautiful Names; call Him by
these Names’ (7:180). The science of the Divine Names lies at
the heart of all Islamic intellectual and religious disciplines—
99 Gerhard Endress, An Introduction to Islam 26 (Carole Hillenbrand trans. 1988).
100 Fazlur Rahman, Islam 12 (2d ed. 1979).
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metaphysics as well as cosmology, theology as well as ethics—
and plays a central role in the practical aspects of religion and
religious worship through the invocation and recitation of
Divine Names, including the Supreme Name, Allah,
particularly in Sufism.”101 For the Moslem believer, “[t]o
remember God is to remember his divine name, radiant with
his presence. Every chapter, or sra, of the Qur’an except the
ninth opens with the basmalah: ‘bismi-Llhi-r-Rahmani-r-
Rahim’ (In the name of Allh, the Compassionate, the
Merciful). The basmalah permeates the Islamic world,
plastered on walls and fences and printed at the beginning of
every book.”102 The basmalah “is used throughout the day by
millions of Muslims all over the world, from starting a meal to
opening a major business venture. Rahman and Rahim in the
Muslim recitation are the first words a baby will hear, and
probably the last ones a dying person will hear. Life thus
begins and ends with the two most beautiful attributes of
God.”103
101 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization 61 (2003).
102 Zaleski & Zaleski, supra n.--, at 148.
103 Akbar S. Ahmed, Living Islam: From Samarkand to Stornoway 31-2 (1993).
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While allowing that “Allah” may be translated into
English as “God,” one prominent Moslem scholar cautions
that, from the perspective of his faith, the terms are not truly
interchangeable. “The Arabic word ‘Allah’ is . . . translatable
as ‘God,’ provided this term is understood to include the
Godhead and is not identified solely with Christian trinitarian
doctrines.”104 The necessity for such caution from a Moslem
perspective demonstrates the hazardousness of assuming that
the terms “Allah” and “God” can simply be equated, without
giving rise to religious friction. How is a secular court to
determine whether a Moslem praying before a legislature and
using the term “Allah,” is “includ[ing] the Godhead” and
excluding “trinitarian doctrines” in that reference and, if so,
whether the term used with that meaning “advances” Islam or
“excludes” Christians? 
 These difficulties are compounded when one reflects on
how “Allah” is described in Moslem reflection and prayer.
Here, for example, are several well-known Koranic verses that
104 Nasr, supra n.--, at 4 (emphasis added).
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a devout Moslem might recite before a legislature,105 and that,
on first inspection, might be considered “non-sectarian”:
He, Allh, is One. Allh is He on Whom all depend. He
begets not, nor is He begotten; and none is like Him.[106]
Karen Armstrong, a prominent scholar of Islam,
comments on these verses as follows:
Christians . . . had also insisted that only the Creator,
the Source of Being, had the power to redeem. They had
expressed this insight in the doctrines of the Trinity and
the Incarnation. The Koran returns to a Semitic idea of
the divine unity and refuses to imagine that God can
‘beget’ a son. There is no deity but al-Lah the Creator of
heaven and earth, who alone can save man and send him
the spiritual and physical sustenance that he needs.[107]
Heard with this theological background in mind, even a
prayer as seemingly “non-sectarian” as this is undoubtedly
“exclusionary” with respect to Christians. And, of course,
105 When Siraj Wahaj, a Muslim imam, became the first Muslim in history to offer
prayers before the U.S. House of Representatives as chaplain of the day on June 25,
1991, he recited verses from the Koran. See Eck, supra n.--, at 31-32. Interestingly,
his prayers invoked the names of “Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammed.”
137 Cong. Rec. H4927-01 (June 25, 1991).
106 Maulana Muhammed Ali, The Holy Koran: Arabic Text, English Translation and
Commentary 1219 (Srah 112) (1995). Our references to the Koran, unless otherwise
attributed, will be to this translation.
107 Karen Armstrong, A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity
and Islam 149 (1993). One Moslem commentator states that the first of these four
verses “proclaims the absolute Unity of the Divine Being, and deals a death-blow to all
forms of polytheism, including the doctrine of the Trinity;” that the third verse “points
out the error of those religions which describe God as being father or son, such as the
Christian religion,” and that the fourth verse “negatives such doctrines as the
[Christian] doctrine of incarnation, according to which a mere man is likened to God.”
Maulana Muhammed Ali, The Holy Koran: Arabic Text, English Translation and
Commentary 1219.
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followers of non-theistic or polytheistic faiths, including
Hinduism, would be likely to feel even more “excluded” by
these monotheistic claims.
The difficulty of determining whether a prayer includes
specifically “sectarian” references can be illustrated again by
considering a famous Moslem prayer known as the “light
verse”108:
Allh is the light of the heavens and the earth. A
likeness of His light is as a pillar on which is a lamp —
the lamp in a glass, the glass is as it were a brightly
shining star – lit from a blessed olive-tree, neither eastern
nor western, the oil whereof gives light, though the fire
touch it not -- light upon light. And Allh guides to His
light whom He pleases. And Allh sets forth parables for
men, and Allh is Knower of all things.[109]
Is this prayer “sectarian”? Initially, it might not seem so.
But on closer inspection, the difficulties start to crowd in. To
begin with, the prayer comes from the Twenty Fourth srah of
the Koran, a specifically Moslem scripture. Having that source
might alone justify considering it to be “sectarian.” Further,
the verses imply that God predestines some but not all to be
saved (“Allh guides to His light whom He pleases”). They also
108William Montgomery Watt, Companion to the Qur’an 165 (1994).
109 The Koran, srah 24:35.
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imply that God is personal (the verses ascribe a “will” to God)
and transcendent (he is said to speak to humans in
“parables”110). And, of course, God is described as “He”—a
gendered term. All of these ways of characterizing God have
provoked, and continue to provoke, passionate religious
disagreements.
D. “Exclusionary” Prayers Within a Single
Monotheistic Religious Tradition.
As Judge John Noonan has remarked, “historically, the
bitterest division and keenest theological hatred have been
between those who are close in their religious heritage and
divided as to its interpretation.”111 Accordingly, even within a
single monotheistic tradition, much traditional prayer
language could readily be viewed as excluding other members
of the very same tradition.
Even so apparently simple and uncontentious a matter
as the use of the name “God” has been attacked by theologians
writing within the Christian tradition.112 The liberal Protestant
110 For the Moslem believer reciting these verses, “[s]o transcendent is [God] that we can
only talk about him in ‘parables.’” Armstrong, supra n.--, at 143.
111Noonan, supra n.--, at 94.
112 See Note, supra n.--, at 1068-69 (surveying diversity of theological views within
contemporary American Christianity).
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theologian Paul Tillich “was convinced that the personal God
of traditional Western theism must go. . . . Tillich agreed with
[Friedrich] Nietzsche that the personal God was a harmful idea
and deserved to die. . . . An omnipotent, all-knowing tyrant is
not so different from earthly dictators . . . . An atheism that
rejects such a God is amply justified . . . . Tillich preferred the
definition of God as the ground of being.”113 A Tillichian
would presumably find references to “God” (even in a prayer
by a Christian minister) as unacceptably “exclusionary.”
Or consider traditional prayers and scriptures that depict
God as terrifying or violent, or that implore his protection in
time of trouble or war.114 One contemporary Roman Catholic
theologian contends that the New Testament — like, in his
view, the Hebrew Bible and the Koran — depicts a God whose
“overwhelming character is that of a violent, punishing,
pathological Deity who uses unfathomable violence to both
reward and punish, either within history or at history’s
113 Armstrong, supra n.--, at 383.
114 For a survey and analysis of such Biblical language, see Tremper Longman III and
Daniel G. Reid, God is a Warrior (1993).
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end.”115 This scholar contends that “[t]he idea that God sent
Jesus to die for our sins makes sense only if we embrace
violent and punishing images of God featured prominently in
Hebrew scriptures.”116 For non-traditional Christians such as
this, prayers that seek God’s protection for the American
nation or success for its military in time of war (surely
common themes of legislative prayer) would likely be seen as
promoting particular Christian perspectives and as
disparaging others.
E. The Question of Judicial Competence
The theological questions posed by prayer are obviously of
the greatest delicacy and sensitivity. That observation,
moreover, may be especially true in a culture such as ours,
which combines a marked commitment to equality and
toleration with an extraordinary range of religions and forms of
belief. Further, the skills required to address such questions
may require some expertise in specialized disciplines such as
theology, Biblical studies, comparative religion, or the history
115 Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Is Religion Killing Us? Violence in the Bible and the Quran
39 (2003).
116 Id. at 60.
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or philosophy of religion, rather than in constitutional law.
While individual judges may, of course, happen to have had
the requisite training, the judiciary as a whole does not.117
The secular courts would nonetheless have to decide
substantive theological questions in order to determine
whether particular legislative prayer language does, or does
not, meet the elusive standard of being “non-sectarian.”
Judicial regulation of legislative prayer therefore runs the risk
of being at once intrusive, obnoxious and incompetent.
The Supreme Court has long taught that the secular courts
should not attempt decide “ecclesiastical questions.”118 And
Marsh itself reinforced that counsel in the specific context of
legislative prayer. Even assuming, then, that ruling on the
“sectarian” nature of prayer is within the constitutional
jurisdiction of a secular court (a question that may be
117 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 616-617 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I can hardly
imagine a subject less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or more
deliberately to be avoided where possible,” than “comparative theology”).
118Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969). See also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
602 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church . . .
disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.”); Maryland & Virginia
Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (Government may not engage in “consideration of doctrinal matters,
whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.”)
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debated), it is surely beyond the institutional competence of
the judiciary.
III. The Discriminatory Effects of Mandating
“Non-sectarian” Legislative Prayer
For many believers, prayer is an activity of the utmost
seriousness and risk. The great Jewish theologian Abraham
Joshua Heschel has likened a person at prayer to “someone
[who has] unsuspectingly pressed a button and [set] a gigantic
wheel-work . . . stormily and surprisingly . . . in motion.”119
Heschel explains:
To name Him is a risk, a forcing of the consciousness
beyond itself. To refer to Him, means almost to get
outside oneself. Every praying person knows how serious
an act the utterance of His name is, for the word is not a
tool but a reflection of the object which it designates.[120]
Further:
Prayer is of no importance unless it is of supreme
importance. It is one of those things which “stand on the
summit of the world,” transcending the world and
ascending to God, “and which men treat lightly.”[121]
Because men treat prayer lightly when they should not,
and because they seek to use prayer as a “tool” for purely
human ends, Heschel condemns merely ceremonial prayer:
119 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man’s Quest for God 29 (1998).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 70 (emphases deleted and citations omitted).
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Customs, ceremonies are fine, enchanting, playful. But
is Judaism a religion of play? . . . Let us be frank. Too
often a ceremony is the homage which disbelief pays to
faith. Do we want such homage? . . . Ceremonies are
expressions of the human mind; what they express and
their power to express depend on a mental act of man;
their significance is gone when man ceases to be
responsive to them. Ceremonies are like the moon, they
have no light of their own.[122]
The dread of reducing prayer to the merely ceremonial
and instrumental – to idolatry – unquestionably deters some
faithful and conscientious believers from seeking to lead
legislative prayers. Others, no less faithful and conscientious,
have been willing to lead such prayers, provided always that
they are free to pray by their own best lights and in the
manner that they believe most honors God. They will pray
even before a governmental body on an official occasion if they
believe that (as Heschel put it) their prayer will truly “expand
the presence of God in the world.”123 It need hardly be said
that believers who will pray only if such conditions are met will
refuse to lead legislative prayers if they are handed a script by
a secular court. They will not join disbelief in a ceremony in
which it pays homage to faith.
122 Id. at 113-14.
123 Id. at 62 (emphasis in original).
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Although believers of any faith are liable to be deterred
from leading legislative prayer once it is subject to judicial
restrictions, the most substantial effects are likely to be felt in
the first instance by Christian clergy. This is because of
judicial restrictions that rather pointedly prohibit any
legislative prayer that invokes the name or asserts the
Lordship of Jesus. Such rulings failed completely to
understand the deeply rooted traditions that take such
invocations to be an essential characteristic of Christian
prayer. What follows outlines that prayer tradition.
A. The Divine Name in the Hebrew Scriptures
Throughout antiquity, it was a widespread belief that “the
name is not just a label but part of the personality of the one
who bears it. . . . The name carries will and power. One must
know the names of gods to have dealings with them or power
over them.”124 Ancient Israel also believed in the significance
of names: thus, God names the stars (Ps. 147:4) and gives
124 H. Bietenghard, art. “onoma,” in Gerhard Kittel & Gerhard Friedrich (eds.),
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 694 (1985) (abridged in one vol., Geoffrey
W. Bromiley (trans.)).
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both Abram/Abraham (Gen. 17:5) and Jacob/Israel (Gen.
32:28) new names.
God also disclosed His own name to Abram/Abraham
(Gen. 17:1) and to Moses (Ex. 6:2-3). The Third
Commandment (by rabbinic reckoning) given to Moses on
Mount Sinai forbade “swear[ing] falsely by the name of the
LORD your God” (Deut. 5:11). “[F]rom where the sun rises to
where it sets, My name is honored among the nations, and
everywhere incense and pure oblation are offered to My name”
(Mal. 1:11). Israel considered itself to be unlike “those who are
not called by [God’s] name” (Is. 63:19). In the ancient Temple
service, after hearing the priests recite the first sentence of the
Shema, the assembled people responded: “Blessed is the
name of His Glorious Majesty forever and ever.”125 Indeed,
other than priests in the Temple, Jews never pronounced the
name of God (the “Tetragrammaton”) as written; in later
Jewish prayer, it is read as “Adonai” or “Lord.”126 Jesus
125 Donin, supra n.--, at 145-46.
126 Id. at 146 & n.*
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himself—a devout Jew127—reflected this sense of reverence for
God’s name when he prayed, “Hallowed be Thy Name” (Mt.
6:9; Lk. 11:2).128
B. The Name of Jesus in the Apostolic Christian Church
Christian believers from the very earliest times attached
overriding significance to the name of Jesus, which in its
Hebrew forms “Jeshua” (or “Jehoshua”) means “Jehovah is
salvation.”129 “The authority of the divine name of Jesus
informs the entire New Testament.”130 Matthew’s Gospel
considers Jesus’ name to be divinely given, so as to attest to
his role in God’s plan of salvation (Mt. 1:21). In the Joannine
Gospel narrative, Jesus himself repeatedly desired and
expected his followers to pray in his name (Jn. 14:13; 15:16;
16:23; 16:26). Indeed, John’s Gospel was written “that you
may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that
127 See, e.g., Geza Vermes, Jesus in his Jewish Context 47-49 (2003). The nature of
Jesus’ Jewishness has been a major theme in recent Jewish and Christian Biblical
scholarship. For a survey, see Leander E. Keck, Who is Jesus? History in Perfect Tense
22-64 (2000).
128 Scholarly commentators have noted the resemblance between this part of Jesus’
prayer and the traditional Jewish “Qaddesh” prayer. See I. Howard Marshall, The
Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text 454 (1978); Samuel Tobias Lachs, A
Rabbinic Commentary on the New Testament: The Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke
119 (1987).
129 See Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “Origin of the Name of Jesus Christ,” available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08374x.htm.
130 Zaleski & Zaleski, supra n. --, at 141.
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believing you may have life in his name” (Jn. 20:31) (emphasis
added). Christian scriptures say that in apostolic times,
Jesus’ followers invoked his name to cast out devils (Mk.
16:17; cp. Mk. 9:38-40); to heal (Acts 3:6; 3:16; 4:7-10; 4:29-
31; 9:34); to preach (Acts 8:12; 9:27; 9:29); to forgive sins
(Acts 10:43); and to baptize (Acts 10:48; Rom. 6:3). The
apostle Peter taught that “there is salvation in no one else, for
there is no other name under heaven given among men by
which we must be saved” (Acts 4:12). The apostle Paul taught
that “at the name of Jesus every knee should bow” (Phil. 2:10).
Christians in the Pauline churches were “washed,” “sanctified”
and “justified” “in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor.
6:11). “These statements about actions being performed in the
name of Jesus are highly significant” for Christian theology,
especially if they are “heard against the Old Testament
background in which it is the name of Yahweh that functions
in this way”: they lead to the “inevitable conclusion” that “the
name of Jesus functions in the same way as the name of
Yahweh and indeed replaces it.”131
131 I. Howard Marshall, New Testament Theology: Many Witnesses, One Gospel 161
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C. The Name of Jesus in the Post-Apostolic Church
The same attitudes, beliefs and patterns of worship are
amply evidenced beginning with the early, post-apostolic
Christian church onwards. Christian patristic writing from
the first and second centuries demonstrates the centrality to
Christian worship and practice of the invocation of Jesus’
name. The Letter of Ignatius of Antioch (d. 98-117) to the
Smyrnaeans says that the sufferings of the believer “must all
be in the name of Jesus Christ.”132 Polycarp, bishop of
Smyrna (martyred 155-156), exhorted the Philippians, “if we
suffer for the sake of [Jesus’ name, let us glorify him.”133 The
Didache (purportedly the “Teachings of the Twelve Apostles”),
an early Christian catechism, forbids anyone to “eat or drink
of [the] Eucharist except those baptized in the Lord’s name.”134
The First Apology of Justin Martyr, a second century Christian
writer, reports that the “president of the brethren” officiating
at the eucharist “sends up praise and glory to the Father of
the universe through the name of the Son and of the Holy
(2004).
132 Cyril C. Richardson (ed. and trans.), The Early Christian Fathers 113 (1996).
133 Id. at 134-35.
134 Id. at 175.
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Spirit.”135 “[T]he second-century Shepherd by the freed slave
Hermas declares that ‘no one will enter the kingdom of God
unless he receives the name of his Son.”136 “[T]he [Roman]
Emperor Justinian says in his law-book: ‘In the Name of Our
Lord Jesus we begin all our consultations.’”137
D. The Name of Jesus in the Contemporary Church
The name of Jesus continues to be invoked and
venerated in all Christian traditions – Catholic, Orthodox and
Protestant. The Roman Catholic Church, for example,
celebrates the Feast of the Holy Name on the second Sunday
after Epiphany.138 A Catholic nun, Sister Wendy Beckett,
writes that “[t]here is power in the very Name, something all
pagan religions know. To know someone’s name means to
have power over them, however external: they will, after all,
turn round for you if you name them aloud, stop in their
tracks, look up. . . . Jesus has freely given us his name,
which means ‘Saviour.’ It has extraordinary power: do we use
135 Id. at 286.
136 Zaleski & Zaleski, supra n.--, at 141.
137 Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “Holy Name of Jesus,” available at
http://www.newadevent.org/cathen/07421a.htm.
138 See Catholic Encyclopedia, article “Feast of the Holy Name,” available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07420a.htm.
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it?”139 The Orthodox tradition has for centuries instilled the
practice of constant repetition of “The Jesus Prayer,” which in
its entirety is: “Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on
me, a sinner.”140 Protestant congregations regularly sing
Edward Perronet’s eighteenth century hymn, “All Hail The
Power of Jesus’ Name!” An Evangelical author and pastor,
Douglas D. Webster, writes that “[a]fter nearly two thousand
years the name of Jesus is more popular than it ever was.”141
E. The Effects of Banning Legislative Prayer
“In Jesus’ Name”
Given the weight, age and authority of these Christian
teachings and practices, as well as the significance that many
contemporary clergy and believers attach to them, any
governmental prohibition on invoking Jesus’ name in
legislative prayer will undoubtedly prevent a substantial
number of Christian believers from praying in a legislative
forum. In an effort to avoid illegitimate governmental
preference for any particular faith by suppressing
139 Sister Wendy Beckett, The Mystery of Love 56 (1996).
140 See Metropolitan Anthony Bloom, “The Jesus Prayer,” available at
http://home.it.net.au/jgrapsas/pages/Jprayer.html.
141 Douglas D. Webster, A Passion for Christ: An Evangelical Christology 75 (1987).
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“denominational particularity,” governmental power would be
wielded to discriminate against the nation’s largest faith
community.
Furthermore, although such a prohibition would weigh
heavily on Christian believers, the logic of such a mandate
would prevent prayers by followers of other faiths as well. If
Christian clergy cannot pray in the name of Jesus, then,
presumably, rabbis could not pray in the name of “the God of
Israel.”142 More broadly, a prohibition of “sectarian” names for
God would make it impossible for a Jewish believer to pray as
a Jew. “[W]hat makes Jewish prayer Jewish? Jewish prayer
is prayer that uses the idiom of the Hebrew Bible and reflects
the Jewish soul. It is prayer that expresses the basic values of
the Jewish people and affirms the central articles of Jewish
faith. It is prayer that reflects our historical experience and
gives expression to our future aspirations. When the prayer of
a Jewish person does not reflect one of these components, he
142 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589 (“We are asked to recognize the existence of a
practice of nonsectarian prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the
Judeo-Christian tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which, for
example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ”). Likewise,
imams could not mention the name of the prophet Mohammed in prayer. And Hindu
priests who were compelled, as a matter of conscience, to invoke the names of Brahma,
Vishnu, Shiva, or Devi the goddess in prayer, could not do so.
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may be praying, but it cannot be said that he is praying as a
Jew.”143
IV. Prohibiting Sectarian Prayer as a Potential
Establishment Clause Violation
There is one further reason why courts and other
governmental bodies should not demand that legislative prayer
be “non-sectarian”: that requirement itself might well be (or
lead to) an Establishment Clause violation.
The Supreme Court’s case law has repeatedly censured
governmental efforts to prescribe the language of prayer. For
example, in one of the early “school prayer” cases, Engel v.
Vitale, the Court said that “the constitutional prohibition
against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at
least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program
carried on by government.”144 Or again: “each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of
143 Donin, supra n.--, at 7.
144 370 U.S. at 424.
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writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely
religious function to the people themselves.”145
Further, the repeated failure of governments (or of
chaplains attempting to follow governmental instruction or
guidance146) to find “non-sectarian” prayers that meet general
acceptance within the relevant political community
underscores the risk that in attempting to preclude
Establishment Clause challenges in this way, the government
may instead merely provoke them. Geoffrey Stone has
written that “even the Regents’ prayer in Engel embodies
numerous sectarian presumptions – that it is appropriate to
pray orally, in unison with others, and in public; that it is
appropriate to invoke divine blessing for one’s parents; that
the appropriate subject of prayer is a unitary, immanent, and
metaphysical ‘“God’” who is ‘“almighty”’; that the appropriate
relationship of human beings to “‘God’” is one of supplication
145 Id. at 435.
146 See, e.g., the Guidelines for Civil Occasions at issue in Lee v. Weisman, or the high
school principal’s recommendation in that case that the officiant, Rabbi Gutterman,
deliver a “nonsectarian” invocation and benediction. 505 U.S. at 581, 588.
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and dependence; and that it is appropriate to ‘’beg’”.”147 And
William P. Marshall has rightly asked
whether the theological aspects of civil religion can be so
thoroughly excised that its exercise becomes
uncontroversial. The Regent’s Prayer in Engel v. Vitale,
after all, held little, if any, more religious content than
what is contemplated by civil religion. Yet any school
prayer will inevitably raise passionate dissent. No matter
how one frames it, there is theistic content in civil
religion, and, as shown by the school prayer example,
defining that content will likely raise [the question of]
divisiveness. . . .[148].
Granting that legislative chaplains or invited legislative
guests do have the constitutional right to pray (if invited), any
coercive attempt by courts or legislatures to direct them to
pray in particular ways may therefore in itself raise substantial
Establishment Clause issues.
The risk of such violations seems greatest if the court or
other governmental body were to restrict prayers to those that
were thought to align with American “civil religion.” In Lee v.
Weisman, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that
“[t]here may be some support, as an empirical observation, to
the statement . . . that there has emerged in this country a
147 Stone, supra n.--, at 829.
148 Marshall, supra n.--, at 26.
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civic religion, one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises
are not,” also seemed to reject the idea that prayers in the
idiom of civil religion would elude Establishment Clause
difficulties: the Court stated that its precedents “caution us to
measure the idea of a civic religion against the central
meaning of the Religion Clauses . . ., which is that all creeds
must be tolerated and none favored. The suggestion that
government may establish an official or civic religion as a
means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more
specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be
accepted.”149
Unquestionably, the Court’s intuition was sound.
Although the Court has never fashioned a comprehensive
definition of “religion” for purposes of Establishment Clause
analysis, it would seem that American “civil religion” would
have to fall under that rubric. As we have seen, the Court’s
jurisprudence entails that atheism counts as a “religion”
under the Constitution. Moreover, at least one federal
appellate court has indicated that secular humanism would
149 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added).
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also do so. Although American civil religion is said to be
“political” rather than “sacral,” we have seen that even Robert
Bellah, the leading sociological exponent of the concept, has
described it as “a genuine apprehension of universal and
transcendent religious reality as seen in or, one could almost
say, as revealed through the experience of the American
people.”150 According to those who have sought to elucidate
the concept, American civil religion has its sacred documents
(the Declaration of Independence; the Gettysburg Address), its
sacred sites (the Arlington National Cemetery), its feast days
(Thanksgiving; Memorial Day), and most importantly its own
conception of God and God’s relation to the American
nation.151 If atheism and secular humanism count as religions
under the Establishment Clause, then so should American
civil religion.152
150 See supra, text at n.--..
151 American civil religion exhibits interesting differences from the civil religion of other
nations, such as that of nineteenth century France, not least because it is not overtly
hostile to historic Christianity. But French republican civil religion, like its American
counterpart, instituted its own feast days (Bastille Day), sang its own hymns (the
Marseillaise), built its own churches (the Panthéon) and worshipped at its own
ceremonies – often spectacular public funerals, such as that in 1885 for Victor Hugo.
See Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe,
from the French Revolution to the Great War 340-41 (2005).
152 See George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution: How Lincoln Redefined American
Democracy 51-2 (2000) (“[N]ondenominational expressions of faith have become normal
in the rituals of the American people. Opening sessions of Congress with a prayer,
76
The historian Arnold Toynbee found that the “worship of
one’s own collective human power, as embodied in a parochial
community and organized in a parochial state, has been in
truth the master religion” of Western civilization.153 One need
not go as far as Toynbee to see that civil religion – even in its
“kinder, gentler” American form – may be or become that very
dangerous form of worship: the self-worship of political
community. Indeed, the “birthing” of American civil religion –
which the Yale historian Harry Stout has recently traced back
to the need to sacralize the Civil War and give meaning to the
immense suffering and loss of life it brought about154 – lends
substance to the fear that it may be a covert form of worship of
an all-too-earthly god. The strategic imperative of fielding
using the Bible in swearing-in ceremonies, recognizing Christmas and Easter as
national holidays—all of these rituals testify to an abiding nondenominational
religiosity. Americans are virtually united in their willingness to advertise a widespread
faith in God. For some reason, this is not generally understood as contradicting the
principle of church and state laid down in the First Amendment.”). If the claims of this
article are correct, American civil religion should be thought to contradict the First
Amendment.
153 Toynbee, supra n.--, at 27.
154 Harry S. Stout, Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War
(2006). “[M]any [Civil War-era observers] saw in the unprecedented destruction of lives
and property something mystical taking place, what we today might call the birthing of
a fully functioning, truly national, American civil religion. It was a meaning difficult for
anyone to articulate at the time; yet some – including soldiers, clergy and, most notably,
Abraham Lincoln – began to posit a moral high ground in the creation of a powerful
national or ‘civil’ religion. As the Civil War progressed onto increasingly eroded moral
ground, something transformative simultaneously took place that would render the war
the defining phenomenon in American history. Patriotism itself became sacralized to
the point that it enjoyed coequal or even superior status to conventional denominational
faiths.” Id. at xvii-xviii (original emphasis).
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enormous armies during the Civil War, the unexpected and
calamitous scale of casualties in that War, the frequent
reversals that occurred in battle and the prolonged stalemates
that followed many campaigns required the Nation’s political
leadership to mobilize the civilian population to endure those
losses and to see the War through to the end. That political
necessity fuelled the emergence of a mystical, sanguinary
American nationalism that served to motivate and to sanctify
the sacrifices on behalf of the American Nation-State that the
War entailed.155 Abraham Lincoln can fairly be said to have
invented a language, rich in religious themes and imagery,
that sought to hallow this new nationalism. American civil
religion is the offspring of Lincoln’s invention, and its origins
in the political necessity of mobilizing and sustaining mass
support for Lincoln’s strategy of “total war” ought not to be
forgotten.
Reflecting on the effects upon nineteenth century publics
of the nationalism fuelled by the wars of that period, Pierre-
155 See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of
History 190, 196 (2002). See also Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of
Citizenship in U.S. History 273-76 (1997) (describing wartime military and political
necessities, together with the religiosity of antislavery crusade, as background of
Lincoln’s “Religious Republican Nationalism”).
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Joseph Proudhon remarked in his War and Peace (1861) that
“[f]or the masses, the real Christ is Alexander, Caesar,
Charlemagne, Napoleon.”156 Nationalism, in other words,
assumed the character and functions of religion. The
recognition that American civil religion originated in the
political and strategic needs of the Civil War yields a truer
understanding of its nature. “The locus of American civil
religion is not the church or the synagogue or the mosque.
Rather it is the state, which uses sacred symbols of the nation
for its own purposes and perpetuation. The appeal proves so
powerful that some contemporary religious critics identify civil
religion with idolatry.”157 American civil religion has freely
appropriated Jewish and Christian language, themes and
imagery to its own use, thus concealing the extent to which
the true object of its worship is the American nation:
“American civil religion borrows so heavily from the language
and cadences of traditional faiths, many Americans see no
conflict or distinction between the two. Many Americans
156 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, La Guerre et La Paix (1861), quoted in John Nef, War and
Human Progress 405 (1950).
157 Stout, supra n.--, at xix.
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equate dying for their country with dying for their faith. In
America’s civil religion, serving country can be coequal with
serving God.”158
Certainly, in the mind of Jean-Jacques Rousseau -- from
whom the idea of civil religion derives – it was to be a form of
self-worship of the national political community. Rousseau
traced the development of civil religion through three major
stages. In the first, pre-Christian phase, “each State, having
its own cult as well as its own government, made no
distinction between its gods and its laws . . . . [T]he provinces
of the gods were, so to speak, fixed by the boundaries of
nations.”159 The second phase was anticipated by the refusal
of the Jews under the domination of Babylon and, later Syria,
to recognize any God but their own; it came to fruition with
the emergence of Christianity. “Jesus came to set up on earth
a spiritual kingdom, which, by separating the theological from
the political system, made the State no longer one, and
brought about the internal divisions which have never ceased
158 Id. at xviii.
159 Rousseau, supra n.--, at 295.
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to trouble Christian peoples.”160 Although efforts were made to
restore the older system (with some success, Rousseau
concedes, in nations like England and Czarist Russia), “the
spirit of Christianity has everywhere prevailed,” and “[t]he
sacred cult has always remained or again become independent
of the Sovereign.”161 From a political point of view, this has
been extremely regrettable: “Christianity as a religion is
entirely spiritual, occupied solely with heavenly things; the
country of the Christian is not of this world.”162 Hence
Christians must be poor citizens: the idea of “a Christian
republic” is a contradiction in terms.163 “True Christians are
made to be slaves.”164 Rousseau therefore envisages a third
phase, in which the breach between Church and State is
healed. In this stage, the Sovereign will fix the articles of “a
purely civil profession of faith.”165 Although these articles are
“not exactly . . . religious dogmas,” they are to be instilled as
“social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good
160 Id. at 297.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 301.
163 Id. at 302.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 303.
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citizen or a faithful subject.”166 These “dogmas of civil religion”
(as Rousseau calls them) are simple and few: “[t]he existence
of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent Divinity, possessed of
foresight and providence, the life to come, the happiness of the
just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social
contract and the laws.”167
American civil religion is not Rousseau’s civil religion.
But the underlying resemblances are important. It seems fair
to say that, despite its historical ties to millenarian
Protestantism and its continuing outward similarity to it,
American civil religion, like Rousseau’s, has at heart a vision
that is distinct from – indeed, antithetical to -- Christianity’s.
The Court’s misgivings about civil religion in Lee v.
Weisman are, therefore, true and sound. The “religion of the
republic” is, indeed, a religion in the constitutional sense; and
a governmental directive to use that religion’s prayer language
is an unconstitutional establishment.
166 Id. at 303-04.
167 Id. at 304.
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V. Constitutionally Valid Sectarian Legislative Prayer
If mandating that legislative prayer be “non-sectarian”
would raise a host of practical and constitutional difficulties,
would permitting “sectarian” prayer be any less problematic?
Would not “sectarian” prayer put the government in the
position of preferring (or appear to prefer) the faith of the
chaplain who gives the prayer? Does not permitting
“sectarian” legislative prayer cause, or risk causing, a
constitutional violation?
The “Pluralist Polity” approach advocated in this paper
denies that permitting sectarian legislative prayer would have
those consequences. The approach seeks to weave together
our tradition of religious liberty with our remarkable religious
diversity to produce a solution that recognizes our different
faiths but that does not unconstitutionally prefer, or even
appear to prefer, any of them. The governing idea, as Judge
(then Professor) Michael McConnell once put it, is that “[i]f
members of minority religions (or other cultural groups) feel
excluded by government symbols or speech, the best solution
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is to request fair treatment of alternative traditions, rather
than censorship of more mainstream symbols.”168
To demonstrate in more concrete detail how the approach
would work, we shall consider what appear to be the three
main models for sectarian legislative prayer, and examine the
strengths and weaknesses of each from the pluralist
perspective. The most attractive model from that perspective,
it is submitted, is also the model that is most likely to
withstand constitutional challenge.
The three models of sectarian legislative prayer are these.
First, as in Marsh, the legislature could designate a
particular person as its regular or official chaplain, and
require that person to lead it in prayers before the start of
official business each day (or on stated occasions). That
chaplain would likely be associated with a particular faith or
denomination, and his or her prayers would likely reflect, at
least to some degree, the beliefs of a specific faith tradition.
Second, individual members of the Legislature could
take turns designating chaplains of the day to lead the
168 McConnell, supra n.--, at 193.
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Legislature in prayer.169 Legislators would not be required to
select chaplains of their own faiths (or the faiths of other
legislators), although they might have some propensity to do
so. Under this model of rotating chaplains, the underlying
diversity of religious beliefs within the Legislature, and
perhaps also the State at large, would be more likely to be
captured than under the first model. The second model does,
however, carry the risk that no chaplains would be selected
from minority or unpopular religions.
The third model resembles the second, but rather than
leaving the selection of rotating chaplains to the unfettered
choice of individual legislators, it would employ some
predetermined formula or device designed to ensure that
minority or unpopular religions were not discriminated against
or left unrepresented. As will be discussed below, any one of a
variety of selection devices might be thought to serve this
function.
169 This model is found in the pending Bosma case. A variant of the model would be a
situation in which individual legislators themselves spoke or prayed in turn, thus
reflecting whatever diversity of religious views existed within their own body.
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The First Model. The strongest argument in favor of the
first model is simply that it was upheld in Marsh. In that case,
a board of the State Legislature chose an official, paid chaplain
every two years. It so happened that the same chaplain – the
Reverend Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister – had
been repeatedly selected and had served for sixteen years.
The Supreme Court noted that “[a]lthough some of his earlier
prayers were often explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all
references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish
legislator.”170 The Court rejected the argument that “Palmer’s
long tenure has the effect of giving preference to his religious
views. We cannot . . . perceive any suggestion that choosing a
clergyman of one denomination advances the belief of a
particular church.”171 Justice Brennan, dissenting, found that
“appointing one chaplain for 16 years may give the impression
of ‘establishing’ one particular religion.”172 More trenchantly,
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, remarked that “I would not
expect to find a Jehovah’s Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker
170 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792, n.14.
171 Id. at 793. Some of Reverend Palmer’s specifically Christian prayers are quoted in
Justice Stevens’ dissent. Id. at 823, n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 808, n.21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the official chaplain in
any state legislature . . . . [I]t seems plain to me that the
designation of a member of one religious faith to serve as the
sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of 16
years constitutes the preference of one faith over another.”173
The Pluralist Polity approach shares Justice Stevens’
perspective on this point. It does indeed seem unlikely, even
twenty three years after Marsh, that any State Legislature in
the country would select a Jehovah’s Witness or a Christian
Scientist – or a Muslim or Buddhist or member of Reverend
Moon’s Unification Church – to be its official chaplain. From
the pluralist standpoint, that deficiency is as regrettable and
as discriminatory as muzzling a Presbyterian chaplain’s
invocation of Jesus’ name in prayer would be. It is believed
that the Court should not allow stare decisis considerations to
lead it to reaffirm this aspect of Marsh.
The Second Model. From the Pluralist Polity perspective,
the second model has several clear advantages over the first.
To begin with, it is far more likely to avoid an unconstitutional
173 Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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preference – or the appearance of a preference – for any
particular faith or denomination. Rather, the model makes it
virtually certain that voices from different religious traditions
will be heard in prayer. It is most unlikely that members of
any single religious denomination or faith will wholly dominate
a State Legislature; and even if that happened to be so, the
desire to reach out to other religious constituencies in the
State would surely lead legislators to invite chaplains from
other faiths to appear. Second, this model honors the
consciences and prayer-lives of individual legislators much
more than the first. The fact that legislative prayer is designed
to be for legislators – to solemnize their gathering, to assist
them in their deliberations, and (in some conceptions) to
implore Divine aid and counsel for them – should never be
forgotten or dismissed. By enabling individual legislators to
select their own daily chaplains, this model makes it more
likely that each legislator will sooner or later hear prayers that
suit, or are at least compatible with, his or her own
convictions. Third, the model limits the risk of sectarian
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contention among legislators over the choice of a chaplain – a
risk that seems to be inherent in the first model.
Nonetheless, even the second model has defects from our
Pluralist Polity perspective. The most serious of these defects
is the risk that the voices of some faiths or denominations will
simply never be heard. Whether intentionally or inadvertently,
legislators may fail to invite chaplains from particular religious
groups because those groups are politically isolated or
unpopular, because their membership is small, or because
they are recent arrivals on the local scene and therefore
unfamiliar. (Indeed, all three of these characteristics may
come together, as is likely to be the case with groups drawn
primarily from recent immigrant communities: the Santeria
church that successfully challenged a discriminatory local
ordinance prohibiting its practice of animal sacrifice in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah174 may have been
such a case.) Whether or not this defect amounts to a
constitutional violation (the exclusion may not be motivated by
174 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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any hostility175), it runs contrary to the constitutional policy of
not disfavoring or excluding any religion.
The third model is more complex than the first two and
encompasses a variety of different forms within itself. This
model in effect conceptualizes the question of legislative prayer
as a matter of the reasonable and fair apportionment of a
scarce government resource (public space or time or the
opportunity to be heard) among persons of different
viewpoints. Constitutional rules for apportioning such
resources have been developed for different applications and –
the theory is -- some of those rules (or combinations of
features of them) might be adapted to serve here as well.
Consider four of these apportionment rules and the analogies
they might generate.
(1) Legislative chaplains or guests invited to pray
might be chosen through some procedure
analogous to non-invidious “demonstrated
175 See id. at 534-35 (considering the subjective motivation of lawmakers); id. at 558
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court’s consideration of motive}; see also Marsh,
463 U.S. at 793 (upholding chaplain’s reappointment because no evidence of
impermissible motive).
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support” qualifications for the presence of
political parties on the ballot.176
(2) Selection might be required to reflect a “fair
cross section” of the relevant political
community’s religious demography, on the
analogy of jury selection.177
(3) Some non-numerical form of “diversity” akin to
that used for student admissions to public post-
graduate programs might be devised.178
(4) Some analogy to Red Lion’s “fairness doctrine”
for political broadcasting on public airwaves
might be adopted.179
Other potentially relevant apportionment rules may
readily come to mind. It is not the purpose of this paper,
however, to identify and defend any particular rule for selecting
and rotating legislative chaplains; indeed, it is likely that any
one of several different rules could underpin constitutionally
valid methods of selection. The bedrock claim here is that by
176 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
177 See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
178 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
179 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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giving expression to the diversity of the State population’s
religious views by means of some such selection procedure,
the Legislature can insure that no unconstitutional preference
or endorsement arises.
To illustrate the third model, consider a selection
procedure in which a Legislature selects its daily chaplains by
permitting each legislator in turn to invite such a guest, but
which also requires that the overall outcome of these
individual invitations reflect the underlying religious diversity
of the State. The Legislature could do this by compiling a list
of the various religions180 within the State’s jurisdiction,
requesting each of those religions to provide a list of names of
its clergy or other members of that faith who would be willing
to serve as a legislative chaplain for a day, and then permitting
individual legislators to designate a legislative chaplain from
the various lists of names, subject to the requirement that at
180 Assuming that Secular Humanism is a religion for Establishment Clause purposes,
it should be included in the list; in any event, the Legislature could otherwise make
provision for the legislators and residents of the State who reject any religious
interpretation of human existence.
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least one representative from each faith is selected during the
course of the legislative year (or other relevant period).181
In creating a list of the religions from which legislative
chaplains may be drawn, the Legislature need not ensure that
literally every religious viewpoint is heard, including “religions”
of a single member. As in other First Amendment contexts,
access need not be made so expansive that the program
becomes “administratively unmanageable.”182 By analogy to
some of the Court’s ballot access cases, it would seem to be
constitutionally defensible for the Legislature to limit the
religious bodies from which it selects its chaplains to those
that have a “significant modicum of support”183 within the
State as a whole. On the other hand, the threshold for listing
should not deliberately be set at a level designed to exclude
unpopular or unfamiliar minority religions: plainly, Lukumi
Babalu Aye precludes such a purpose.184 So if Wiccans
181 The proposal is partly based on the practice of the U.S. Army, which has been to
“establish[] quotas [of Army chaplains] based on the denominational distribution of the
population of the United States as a whole.” Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d at 225-26.
182 Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985).
183 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1972). See also American Party of Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Maryland Green Party v. Maryland Board of Elec., 377 Md.
127, 153 (2003).
184 See McConnell, supra n.--, at 193 (“If a government refuses to cooperate with
minority religious . . . groups within the community, there may be a basis for inferring
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comprise, say, 1% of the State population, the threshold for
listing may not be set at 2% in order to exclude them.185
A Legislature implementing this selection procedure
might take the further step of apportioning time among the
listed religions in proportion to each religion’s share of the
State population. Although the objectivity of such a formula
might avoid controversies over perceived “over-” or “under-
representation,” it does not seem to be required in order to
avoid an unconstitutional preference for any single faith. To
quote Judge McConnell again, “Courts should not encourage
the proliferation of litigation by offering the false hope that
perfect neutrality can be achieved through judicial fine-tuning.
Judicial scrutiny should be reserved for cases in which a
particular religious position is given such public prominence
that the overall message becomes one of conformity rather
than pluralism.”186 Moreover, such mathematical
that the choice of symbols was a deliberate attempt to use government influence to
promote a particular religious position.”).
185 See Eck, supra n.--, at 358-59 (describing controversy over the practice of
accrediting Wiccan military chaplains, and quoting statement of military official that
“[t]he Department of Defense does not evaluate, judge, or officially sanction any
religious faith. It is not up to us to judge religions or make a list of denominations or
religious groups that are officially acceptable”).
186 McConnell, supra n.--, at 193.
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straitjacketing would limit the ability of individual legislators
to designate the chaplains of their own choice – thus
diminishing the chances that legislative chaplains will be
serving the religious needs of the Legislature’s members.
The advantages of this form of the third model are
(hopefully) obvious. First, it seems plainly unobjectionable on
Establishment Clause grounds: no particular faith or religious
tradition can be said to be “preferred” to any other when
(effectively) all are given the opportunity to be heard. The
fairness and (near-)comprehensiveness of the model should
dispel both the fact and the appearance of unconstitutionality.
Second, none of the main objections to “non-sectarian”
legislative prayer can arise on this approach. The attempt to
pursue the will o’ the wisp of “non-sectarianism” is
abandoned; discriminatory effects on particular religions are
avoided or minimized; there is no question of establishing a
political “civil religion” in the guise of avoiding the
establishment of “sectarian” religion; the risk of improper
judicial micromanagement of the contents of legislative prayer
is obviated. Third, including chaplains from minority religions
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in the legislative program is likely to have salutary, integrative
effects on their members, who will often be new citizens. In
other words, open recognition of the pluralism of our
religiously composite nation will serve to bind Americans of all
religious opinions more closely together. This last point
deserves some elaboration.
Harvard’s Diana Eck, a careful and informed scholar of
American religious pluralism, has noted the effect on
American Muslim opinion of the first appearance of a Muslim
chaplain, Siraj Wahaj, before the U.S. Congress. Eck writes
that “after many decades of Christian and Jewish prayers, the
first Islamic prayers before Congress do indeed constitute a
landmark in American public life.”187 She further notes that
the weekly Muslim Journal tracks “dozens of other [similar]
events, many of them local and regional, but all of them
significant signals of changes that go almost unrecorded in the
popular press,” such as the first-ever Muslim prayers before
the Norfolk City Council or the opening of the California
187 Eck, supra n.--, at 67.
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Legislature’s session with a Muslim prayer.188 Eck has found
that by inviting Muslims and other members of minority
religious communities to participate in the public square in
these and other ways, our government and our society are
nourishing a stronger sense of identification with America and
its values among the members of those communities. She
recounts the experience of Dr. Rajwani Singh, a Sikh
immigrant and naturalized citizen, who was asked to offer a
prayer at the Lincoln Memorial to commemorate the
anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream”
speech. Dr. Singh later described to Professor Eck the
powerful impact that participating in the event at the Lincoln
Memorial had on him: “When I saw a hundred thousand
people there, I could not believe that I had been asked to pray.
For the first time, I felt America was my home.”189
Conclusion
The problem of legislative prayer is not marginal to
Establishment Clause doctrine. Thinking through the
consequences of permitting legislative prayer forces into the
188 Id.; see also id. at 353-56.
189 Quoted in id. at 68.
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open fundamental questions about the right relationship
between Church and State. Can the Church enter the public
space of the legislative forum without compromising its duty
and power to witness? And can the State permit the Church
to enter that public space without losing the impartiality it
must observe when dealing with religion?
If the argument of this paper is correct, the terms on
which the Church and State may share this space preclude
any attempt by the State to dictate to the Church what it may
say. Either the Church must be free to speak its own truth, or
it should remain silent. But, correspondingly, the Church
must speak with many voices, not a single, authoritative one.
Like “America singing,” the Church too must bring forth its
own “varied carols.”190
190 Walt Whitman, “I hear America singing,” in Leaves of Grass (1900).
